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CRIMINAL LAW 
STRUCTURING PRE-PLEA CRIMINAL 
DISCOVERY 
DANIEL S. MCCONKIE* 
Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions come from guilty pleas.1 
Defendants rely on prosecutors for much of the information about the 
government’s case on which the decision to plead is based. Although 
federal prosecutors routinely turn over most necessary discovery to the 
defense, the law does not generally require them to turn over any 
discovery before the guilty plea. This can lead to innocent 
defendants pleading guilty and to guilty defendants pleading guilty 
without information that could have affected the agreed-upon sentence. 
This Article argues that the lack of a judicially enforceable pre-plea 
discovery regime flouts structural protections that due process is supposed 
to provide. Defendants who plead not guilty and go to trial get a jury to 
adjudicate guilt and a judge to preside over the proceedings and pronounce 
sentence. The judge and jury hear an adversarial presentation of the 
evidence, and the judge at sentencing can consider an even broader 
spectrum of information about the defendant and the crime. But defendants 
who plead guilty effectively act as their own judge and jury. Unfortunately, 
because prosecutors are not required to provide any pre-plea discovery, the 
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defendant who pleads guilty may not have nearly as much information as 
the judge and jury would have had at trial and sentencing. 
The Supreme Court has employed a balancing test to determine 
whether a particular procedure comports with due process. This Article 
proposes tailoring that test to the pre-plea discovery context. The proposed 
test would ask (1) whether the defense is getting sufficient information 
before the guilty plea to promote accurate sorting of the innocent from the 
guilty and reasonably informed and consistent sentencing; (2) whether 
there are clear rules that allow judges, before a guilty plea, to regulate 
prosecutors’ decisions not to disclose; and (3) whether the production of 
pre-plea discovery in a given case imposes undue costs on society. 
One hopeful development is that several district courts, pursuant to 
congressionally-granted authority, have promulgated local rules for pre-
plea discovery. I argue that these time-tested local rule innovations should 
be incorporated into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to give clear 
standards to prosecutors and authority to judges to enforce expansive pre-
plea discovery. 
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Consider the unusual case of a federal criminal defendant who is tried 
by a jury. That defendant has constitutional and statutory rights to 
discovery, which are necessary for him to prepare a defense. The jury 
adjudicates guilt based on an adversarial presentation of evidence presided 
over by a neutral judge. If the jury convicts, the judge can consider an even 
broader quantity of information to determine a just sentence. 
Now, consider the more typical defendant who pleads guilty. Instead 
of extended proceedings before a judge and jury, that defendant adjudicates 
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his own case by declaring himself guilty. He also agrees to his own 
sentence, or at least to its principal terms. No jury hears the evidence, and 
the plea agreement may leave little or no room for the judge to exercise 
much sentencing discretion. In effect, that defendant acts as his own judge 
and jury. Another key feature of the guilty plea is that the defendant may 
plead guilty with much less information than the judge and jury had in the 
trial scenario. True, federal prosecutors routinely provide pre-plea discovery 
as they see fit, but federal defendants have no statutory or constitutional 
rights defining the appropriate scope of such disclosures. 
In the trial example, a conviction requires structural protections 
consistent with separation of powers principles. First, there needs to be a 
concurrence of the tri-partite branches: the prosecutor (executive) brings 
charges according to the law (passed by the legislature), and the pre-trial 
proceedings, trial, and sentencing are presided over by a judge. Next, the 
jury serves as a non-governmental check on the power of the state to 
deprive its citizens—consistent with due process—of life, liberty, or 
property. In contrast, in the guilty plea example, there is no trial jury, and 
the judge may do little more than accept the guilty plea and pronounce 
sentence according to the terms of the plea agreement. The prosecutor is the 
dominant player, choosing her charges and her defendants and leveraging 
guilty pleas with the threat of a trial penalty (the differential between the 
sentence offered as part of the plea deal and the sentence imposed after 
trial). 
Another key difference between the two examples is the flow of 
information to the decision-maker. In the trial example, the defendant has 
statutory and constitutional rights to pre-trial discovery. He can seek 
judicial enforcement of his statutory rights at any stage in the case, although 
his constitutional discovery rights are generally only enforceable after the 
trial. But in the guilty plea example, the defendant has no such rights. He 
pleads guilty based on his own independent knowledge of the case and the 
information that the prosecution, in its sole discretion, chooses to provide. 
This flow of information is critical to the proper disposition of criminal 
cases. Innocent defendants need evidence in the prosecution’s possession 
that tends to demonstrate their innocence. Without that information, they 
may plead guilty to cut their losses. Even guilty defendants need 
information from the prosecution to rationally plea bargain and to be 
sentenced consistently with other cases. For example, a drug trafficker’s 
sentence depends in large part on the quantity of drugs trafficked. But 
without access to lab reports, the trafficker may not be aware of the quantity 
and purity involved. Likewise, members of a large fraud ring may not even 
know of each other’s existence, but evidence that inculpates one defendant 
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may exculpate another. These two examples illustrate how inculpatory 
evidence is relevant not only to guilt, but also to sentencing. Because plea 
deals routinely decide both the charges of conviction and the sentencing 
consequences, even guilty defendants need enough information about the 
government’s evidence against them to make an informed decision about 
whether to waive their constitutional rights. And if prosecutorial discretion 
is not regulated by consistent, enforceable rules for pre-plea discovery, 
similarly situated defendants may strike different plea bargains based solely 
on differing amounts of criminal discovery that they happen to receive from 
the prosecutor assigned to the case. 
There is a strong connection between the justice system’s structural 
protections and the flow of information from the prosecution necessary for 
proper adjudication and sentencing. As a practical matter, prosecutors 
generally have access to the entire contents of the criminal investigation and 
the case against the defendant. Congress and the Supreme Court have 
formulated discovery rules for a trial-based procedure. Judges have 
enforced these rules, thereby greatly increasing the flow of information to 
the defense, benefitting defendants (especially innocent ones) and society. 
In contrast, for the vast majority of defendants who plead guilty, federal 
prosecutors give up only as much pre-plea discovery as they feel is 
appropriate, according to agency policies, ethical rules, and their own 
individual discretion. They have no statutory or constitutional obligation 
before a guilty plea to turn over discovery that helps the defendant 
(“exculpatory evidence”), although the Department of Justice generally 
requires prosecutors to turn over exculpatory evidence (but not evidence 
that could impeach a government witness) before a guilty plea. They 
routinely turn over enough evidence that hurts the defendant (“inculpatory 
evidence”) to incentivize the guilty plea, but prosecutors may not recognize 
when evidence could help the defendant, and without any real possibility 
that a judge will force them to hand over certain categories of pre-plea 
discovery, prosecutors are not likely to do so. On the other hand, too much 
pre-plea discovery threatens the efficient operation of plea bargaining and 
other public interests, such as the safety of witnesses. 
The Supreme Court has not decided whether plea bargaining 
defendants have a general right to discovery of exculpatory evidence.2 The 
Court has already decided that such defendants have no right to discovery 
of inculpatory evidence.3 But that holding is in tension with an oft-repeated 
 
2 The Supreme Court has concluded that plea bargaining defendants have no right to 
impeachment evidence, but that is only one category of exculpatory evidence. See discussion 
of United States v. Ruiz, infra Part III(B). 
3 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). 
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principle running through the Court’s due process and compulsory process 
jurisprudence: providing defendants with information relevant to the 
preparation of their defense enables the adversary system to properly 
function so that juries can adjudicate accurately and judges can sentence 
fairly. 
Although scholars have written extensively about how plea bargaining 
has consolidated power in the prosecution generally, no one has critiqued 
this consolidation of power in pre-plea discovery.4 In fact, the failure of 
Congress and the Supreme Court to regulate pre-plea discovery has likely 
reduced the accuracy of adjudication and increased unwarranted disparities 
in sentencing. 
Part I discusses the importance of checks and balances in the criminal 
justice system between prosecutors, trial judges, and the trial jury. Plea 
bargaining has consolidated too much power in prosecutors, and the 
absence of constraints on prosecutors in pre-plea discovery is a good 
example. Factually innocent defendants need pre-plea discovery because, if 
they are unaware of hard evidence in the government’s possession that 
would exonerate them, they might rationally decide to plead guilty. But 
even factually guilty defendants need inculpatory evidence against them for 
several reasons: the adversary system cannot function unless the defense is 
adequately informed; evidence that appears inculpatory might, in the hands 
of the defense, prove to be exculpatory or mitigating; and sentencing across 
cases may be inconsistent unless prosecutors are guided by clear, judicially 
enforceable rules. 
In Part II, I discuss how due process is closely related to separation of 
powers principles: the executive should not enforce the law except through 
a courtroom procedure presided over by neutral decision-makers (judges 
and juries). The Brady rule restrains executive discretion in discovery for 
exculpatory evidence but not for apparently inculpatory evidence that might 
be relevant and helpful to the defense at trial.5 But in other discovery cases 
decided outside of the Brady v. Maryland line, the Supreme Court has 
applied a pre-trial materiality test that measures the potential use of the 
information to the defense. Such a test, if applied to the plea-bargaining 
context, would result in broader pre-plea discovery. A novel contribution of 
my article is that it highlights the tension between Supreme Court cases that 
acknowledge the importance of adequate discovery in preparing a defense 
and other cases in which the Supreme Court has refused to extend discovery 
 
4 See infra note 8. This Article does not address the discovery that the defense owes the 
prosecution, because the information deficit in criminal cases disadvantages the defense 
much more than the prosecution. 
5 See infra Part II(B). 
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rights to pre-plea discovery. 
In Part III, I describe how criminal due process has come to favor 
balancing tests (based on Mathews v. Eldridge)6 that are flexible enough to 
accommodate modern procedural problems, like pre-plea discovery. 
Unfortunately, when the Supreme Court had the opportunity in 2002 to 
apply such a test to pre-plea discovery in United States v. Ruiz, it failed to 
recognize that plea bargaining defendants need enforceable discovery rights 
to potentially exculpatory information. I propose taking the Eldridge test 
and tailoring it to the pre-plea discovery context. My proposed test—a 
novel contribution itself to the literature and a blueprint for future 
reforms—asks (1) whether the defense (acting as its own judge and jury) is 
getting sufficient information before the guilty plea to promote both 
accurate sorting of the innocent from the guilty and reasonably informed 
and consistent sentencing; (2) whether there are there clear judicial 
standards to review the prosecutor’s decision not to disclose that can be 
enforced before the guilty plea; and (3) whether the production of pre-plea 
discovery imposes undue costs on society. 
My claim is modest: I do not argue that due process necessarily 
requires general discovery of both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence. 
The Supreme Court has rejected such a requirement in many cases, and it 
may not be practical for the Court to make fine-grained, constitutional 
discovery rules that balance the relevant interests without spawning 
litigation that would impede the efficient operation of plea bargaining, 
which the Court has consistently endorsed. 
Instead, my balancing test—rooted in both a structural critique and 
sound public policy principles—can provide guidance for good discovery 
rule-making. In Part IV, I argue that the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure should be amended to create a consistent national regime of 
liberal pre-plea discovery. Prosecutors’ discretion to withhold discovery 
needs to be checked, and judges are the ones to do it. But judges cannot do 
so efficiently and consistently without clear procedural rules regulating pre-
plea discovery. 
Because amendments to Rule 16 do not appear to be forthcoming, I 
examine how district courts have used congressionally delegated authority 
to promulgate local rules regulating pre-plea discovery. Such rules often 
create a rebuttable presumption that the prosecution will provide most of 
the discovery that Rule 16 requires, and often a good deal more, including 
exculpatory evidence, soon after the arraignment. Although defendants who 
plead guilty will never have full knowledge of the government’s case, such 
 
6 See infra Part III(A). 
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local rules at least aim to provide a comparable amount of information to 
defendants who plead guilty as to those defendants who go to trial. My 
structural critique makes an original contribution to the literature in 
providing a constitutional rationale for these local rules by showing how 
they are consistent with my proposed due process balancing test. And, 
although this Article focuses on the federal criminal justice system, much of 
its analysis is also applicable to state systems with weak pre-plea discovery 
regimes.7 
I. THE UNCHECKED POWER OF PROSECUTORS TO DENY PRE-PLEA 
DISCOVERY 
The criminal justice system has historically had its own system of 
checks and balances between the legislature, prosecutors, trial judges, and 
the trial jury. Plea bargaining has upset the old balance by consolidating too 
much power in prosecutors. The lack of a consistent federal pre-plea 
discovery regime is a good example of this phenomenon. Plea bargaining 
defendants need expansive information about their case to make intelligent 
decisions about whether and on what terms to plead guilty. Unfortunately, 
since federal prosecutors have unchecked discretion to decide what pre-plea 
discovery to provide, defendants do not always get enough information to 
do so. 
A. PLEA BARGAINING PROSECUTORS HAVE TOO MUCH DISCRETION 
TO WITHHOLD DISCOVERY 
As numerous scholars have noted, plea bargaining procedure has 
consolidated too much power into the hands of prosecutors.8 Briefly, this is 
because prosecutors choose their defendants and the criminal charges. 
Those charges carry sentencing consequences, either through mandatory 
minimums or advisory guidelines that judges widely follow. Judges, who 
lack the resources to provide many jury trials, rarely reject plea agreements, 
even though those agreements effectively remove the judge from the 
adjudication of the case. Instead, the real adjudication happens in private 
 
7 Some states, like Texas and North Carolina, have strong pre-plea discovery rules; 
others, like Virginia, do not. See Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-
Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV 285, 
293–94 (2016). 
8 For a sampling of the vast academic literature on this point, see, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, 
PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 205–30 (2003); 
see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
50, 52–53 (1968); Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1061–76 (1976); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as 
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987–88 (1992). 
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negotiations between the prosecutor and the defense attorney, finalized in 
one brief guilty plea hearing on the record. The in-court proceedings before 
the guilty plea are shortened to minimize the resources expended on the 
case and maximize the sentencing discount for the defendant. To assure the 
defendant that he will receive the benefit of his bargain, the plea agreement 
usually limits the judge’s discretion at sentencing to impose a more severe 
sentence.9 And because the defendant waives his right to a jury trial, no jury 
will ever be summoned as a populist check on the government’s case. The 
Supreme Court has placed few limits on plea bargaining prosecutors.10 
Plea bargaining prosecutors likewise have very broad discretion to 
withhold pre-plea discovery. The Supreme Court has principally regulated 
criminal discovery through the rule of Brady and its progeny. But by its 
own terms, Brady is a trial-related rule that does not apply to pre-plea 
discovery.11 (The Supreme Court has declined to extend the Brady rule to 
pre-plea discovery of impeachment evidence,12 but has not yet decided 
whether to extend Brady to pre-plea discovery of other categories of 
exculpatory evidence.)13 Only in rare cases will trial judges order pre-trial 
discovery under Brady, such as where the defense can describe specific 
exculpatory evidence that the prosecution has withheld.14 
 
9 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow the parties to specify the sentence on a 
guilty plea, with the judge’s permission. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). More frequently, the 
parties reach agreements as to certain Sentencing Guideline variables that largely determine 
the sentence (such as drug quantity or fraud loss amount). At a minimum, defendants who 
plead guilty almost always qualify for the “acceptance of responsibility” reduction under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines, which usually results in about a one-third reduction of 
the sentence in serious cases. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (2004); see also G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, 
PLEA BARGAINING 99 (3d ed. 2012); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as 
Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1011 & n.4, 1012, 
1017 & n.21 (2005) (collecting citations); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, 
N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 20, 2014 (“[T]he plea bargains usually determine the 
sentences, sometimes as a matter of law and otherwise as a matter of practice.”). 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (decision whether to 
prosecute may not be based on race, religion, or other arbitrary classification). 
11 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002); infra Part III(B). 
12 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633. 
13 See id. At least one appellate court has found that it likely does. See McCann v. 
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that it is likely a due process 
violation for a prosecutor who is aware of defendant’s innocence to withhold exculpatory 
evidence before the guilty plea); see also Daniel Conte, Note, Swept Under the Rug: The 
Brady Disclosure Obligation in a Pre-Plea Context, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 74, 
90–92 (2012). 
14 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (“In the typical case where a 
defendant makes only a general request for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland[], 
it is the State that decides which information must be disclosed. Unless defense counsel 
becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court’s 
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Congress, through the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has 
mandated far more discovery than Brady requires. Rule 16 requires 
prosecutors to produce statements of the defendant, documents and objects 
relevant to the case, the defendant’s criminal history, reports of 
examinations and tests, and expert witness reports. It requires the defense to 
produce some reciprocal discovery.15 Trial judges have broad discretion to 
enforce violations of the rule.16 If there are witness safety concerns, 
prosecutors can seek a protective order from the court excusing compliance 
with discovery requirements.17 Rule 16 does not prescribe time limits on 
any of the discovery but implies that the required disclosures are to be made 
before trial. Critically, it does not, by its own terms, require any discovery 
to be produced before a guilty plea.18 
Outside of Rule 16, the Jencks Act specifies that the parties shall not 
be required to produce witness statements (except for those of expert 
witnesses19), until after those witnesses have testified on direct examination 
at trial.20 Obviously, such a rule does not apply to pre-plea discovery. 
Other Rules of Criminal Procedure also serve to augment Rule 16 
discovery. Rule 17 governs the issuance of defense subpoenas, which can 
be issued at any point in the case. Such subpoenas help the defense to 
obtain critical evidence.21 Rule 11(d) allows the defendant to withdraw a 
guilty plea after the court has accepted it but before the imposition of 
sentence for a “fair and just reason.” Many federal courts have adjudicated 
Brady claims pursuant to this rule.22 
 
attention, the prosecutor’s decision on disclosure is final.”); see also United States v. Caro-
Muñiz, 406 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting a Brady/Ritchie claim for failure to specify 
exculpatory evidence). 
15 FED R. CRIM. P. 16(b). 
16 FED R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2). 
17 FED R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1). 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 53 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Absent bad 
faith[,] . . . the critical time for disclosure of sentence-related information is not prior to the 
taking of a plea, but prior to sentencing.”); see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial 
Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 211 & 
n.46 (2006). 
19 FED R. CRIM. P. 16. 
20 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (codifying Jencks Act and 
extending it to other contexts, like suppression motions). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
6 excepts grand jury transcripts from discovery. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 
441 U.S. 211 (1979). 
21 See discussion of United States v. Nixon, infra Part II(D)(1). 
22 Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea 
Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 17 & n.79 (2002) (collecting cases). 
Unfortunately, the “fair and just” standard is amorphous. See generally id. at 18. 
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The Department of Justice has its own internal discovery guidelines 
for federal prosecutors.23 Although Department policy sometimes requires 
federal prosecutors to provide more discovery than the law requires,24 it 
does not always provide bright-line rules for pre-plea discovery. Instead, 
the Department requires line prosecutors to carefully evaluate their 
discovery obligations in each case, keeping the broader aims of justice in 
mind.25 One important exception is that federal prosecutors must turn over 
exculpatory evidence “reasonably promptly” after it is discovered.26 
The Department also has an internal division, the Office of 
Professional Responsibility, which is charged with administering internal 
discipline to prosecutors who violate the law or Department policy. 
However, instances of such discipline are few.27 Federal prosecutors are 
also required to abide by the ethical rules of the state in which they practice 
and are subject to discipline by state bar associations.28 But state bars are 
notorious for under-enforcing their rules of conduct, especially for federal 
 
23 See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Guidance for 
Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery for Department Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), http://
www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00165.htm; Memorandum 
from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Requirement for Office Discovery Policies in 
Criminal Matters for the Heads of Department Litigating Components Handling Criminal 
Matters (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-to-usas-component-heads.pdf; 
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Issuance of Guidance and 
Summary of Actions Taken in Response to the Report of the Department of Justice Criminal 
Discovery and Case Management Working Group for Department Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 
2010), http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo.pdf; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, 
Deputy Att’y Gen., on Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery for 
Department Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.pdf; 
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., on Department Policy on Charging and 
Sentencing to all Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files
/holdermemo.pdf. 
24 Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633, 1636–37 (2011). 
25 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
26 Podgor, supra note 24, at 1638–39; see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL § 165 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-
165-guidance-prosecutors-regarding-criminal-discovery; Colloquy, Criminal Discovery, 
ASSISTANT U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Sept. 2012 (whole issue devoted to criminal discovery). The 
Department has given further guidance to prosecutors in a treatise published as part of the 
Office of Legal Education’s “Bluebook” series of training manuals. Unfortunately, the 
Criminal Discovery Bluebook is not available to the public. 
27 See Nick Schwellenbach, Hundreds of Justice Department Attorneys Violated 
Professional Rules, Laws, or Ethical Standards, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT (Mar. 
13, 2014), http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2014/hundreds-of-justice-attorneys-
violated-standards.html. 
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1998) (also known as the McDade Amendment). 
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prosecutors.29 
In short, federal prosecutors have no legal obligation to provide pre-
plea discovery unless a judge orders it. As I demonstrate in the next section, 
this can leave some plea-bargaining defendants in the dark. 
B. WHY DEFENDANTS NEED BROAD PRE-PLEA DISCOVERY 
In the same way that a trial jury needs expansive information to 
properly adjudicate guilt and a trial judge needs even more information to 
pronounce a reasonable sentence, defendants need expansive information to 
intelligently plead guilty and agree to a sentence, or at least the contours of 
a sentence. Before they plead guilty, they need access to both exculpatory 
and inculpatory evidence in the prosecutor’s possession. 
1. Exculpatory Evidence 
The case for exculpatory evidence is straightforward. For factually 
innocent defendants (that is, those defendants who did not commit the 
charged crimes), broad pre-plea discovery is especially important. Factually 
innocent persons are not inclined to plead guilty. Indeed, they may know 
nothing about the crime at all, as in cases of misidentification. However, 
even factually innocent defendants will plead guilty if it appears to them 
that their chance of conviction at trial, which carries a much higher 
sentence, is high.30 Thus, a correct understanding of the weaknesses of the 
prosecution’s case is critical to them31 so they can bargain for a reduced 
sentence.32 
Even factually guilty33 defendants for whom there is exculpatory 
evidence should have the opportunity to realistically gauge their chances of 
conviction at trial in light of the exculpatory evidence. This is because those 
 
29 See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3(a) & n.12.6 (3d ed. 
2007) (in over two hundred cases between 1997 and 2010 in which federal judges had found 
serious prosecutorial misconduct, only six federal prosecutors were disciplined) (citing Brad 
Heath & Kevin McCoy, States can discipline federal prosecutors, rarely do, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 8, 2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-12-09-RW_
prosecutorbar09_ST_N.htm). 
30 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (allowing defendants to plead 
guilty while still maintaining their innocence). 
31 Lain, supra note 22, at 29. 
32 For a list of articles explaining why pre-plea discovery is necessary for fair plea 
bargaining, see John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and 
Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 441 n.17 (2001). 
33 Defined as those defendants who committed the charged crimes and for whom the 
prosecution apparently possesses sufficient evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
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defendants are still being asked to waive their constitutional rights to avoid 
an enhanced post-trial sentence. At trial, due process requires that the jury 
hear an adversarial presentation of the evidence to render a verdict—
independent of the prosecutor—of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.34 Plea 
bargaining defendants who are acting as their own jury need that same 
information to develop a defense that is independent of the prosecution’s 
narrative; otherwise, they may plead guilty under the false impression that 
the prosecution’s case is stronger than it really is.35 
Evidence necessary for litigation of dispositive pre-trial motions, such 
as motions to suppress evidence because of police conduct that violates the 
Fourth Amendment, can also be termed “exculpatory.” Mandating early 
pre-plea discovery of evidence related to such claims can help ensure that it 
is taken into account at the bargaining table, which in turn can deter official 
misconduct.36 
2. Inculpatory Evidence 
The case for giving defendants exculpatory evidence is fairly intuitive, 
but the reasons for giving factually guilty defendants inculpatory evidence 
are less obvious. 
The single best reason to mandate broad disclosure of inculpatory 
evidence is to help ensure that defendants get the exculpatory evidence they 
need. It is not always easy for prosecutors to tell the difference between the 
two categories. The Supreme Court’s Brady test for judging whether 
exculpatory evidence was improperly withheld asks, after the trial, whether 
the withheld evidence would have been “material,” meaning reasonably 
likely to change the verdict or sentence in the defendant’s favor. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible for prosecutors to make this determination 
before trial, because they cannot predict what evidence the jury might 
 
34 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
35  “Since the defendant bases his choice of plea ultimately on a subjective assessment 
of his chances of conviction, the state can make the bargain appear more attractive to him by 
encouraging him to overestimate his chance of conviction at trial. Thus, manipulation of the 
defendant’s perception of his chance of conviction can create a substantial risk of 
incremental inaccuracy. Procedural due process requires that defendants be given the 
information and assistance necessary to make a reasonably reliable assessment of their 
chance of conviction at trial.” Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as 
Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 933 (1980); see also R. Michael 
Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment 
Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1465–66 (2011); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and 
Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 959 (1989). 
36 See infra Part II(D)(2) for a discussion of defendants’ rights to discovery for such 
motions. 
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eventually hear and they are not privy to the defense’s case.37 The Supreme 
Court’s invitation for prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure38 is not 
enough to save an unworkable rule, which the Court itself has recognized as 
“inevitably imprecise.”39 Furthermore, prosecutors work in an adversary 
system; they do battle against the defense to obtain convictions. It takes 
difficult mental gymnastics, even for scrupulous prosecutors, to believe in 
the defendant’s guilt but also “put on the defense attorney’s hat” to think 
about how certain evidence could help the defendant.40 All this weighs in 
favor of a pre-plea discovery regime that casts a wide enough net over even 
apparently inculpatory evidence to ensure that the requisite exculpatory 
evidence makes it into the hands of the defense.41 
A second reason why plea bargaining defendants need broad pre-plea 
discovery has to do with the role such defendants play in the system. If 
judges and juries need broad information relating to guilt and sentencing to 
adequately perform their Article III functions, defendants who plead 
guilty—effectively acting as their own jury and judge—should, to the 
extent possible, get the same amount of information. 
Of course, plea bargaining defendants may still decide to waive their 
right to such information as part of a plea agreement. To prohibit such 
waivers, except as to Brady material, would probably wring too much 
efficiency out of plea bargaining for the system to bear. Still, such waivers 
could at least be minimized with pre-plea discovery rules requiring 
prosecutors to provide most discovery soon after the arraignment unless the 
court excused compliance on a showing of good cause. Such waivers could 
also be made more intelligent by insisting that the defense be informed of 
the nature of the evidence that the prosecution would not disclose.42 And 
such waivers should be construed narrowly and accepted only if also in the 
 
37 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 701 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
38 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (advising prosecutors not to tack too 
closely to the wind); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 699 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
39 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976). 
40 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 696–97 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing how difficult it is 
for prosecutors to appreciate how evidence in their own files might be helpful to the 
accused). 
41 Id.; see also Douglass, supra note 32, at 495–96. 
42 For example, prosecutors can disclose the general nature of impeachment evidence 
against a confidential informant without revealing the confidential informant’s identity. 
Some scholars have argued that Brady rights should not be waivable at all, and that all Brady 
evidence (including impeachment evidence) should be turned over before a guilty plea. See 
Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, 
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2045 (2000) (describing limits to 
plea bargaining waivers). 
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public interest. 
There is a common objection to granting broad defense discovery of 
the prosecution’s case: if factually guilty defendants know what they did, 
don’t they already know the government’s case against them? The matter is 
not so simple. The government’s pre-trial case against a defendant may 
consist of official reports, documents, witness interviews, and items of 
evidence. Without access to those documents and items, the defense may 
not be aware of the nature or strength of the government’s case. Although 
the defendant may have a subjective recollection of events, that recollection 
may not be accurate (as where the defendant was intoxicated or suffered 
from a mental infirmity) and will be limited to the defendant’s personal 
perspective. The defendant may not cooperate with appointed defense 
counsel due to fear or mistrust.43 Furthermore, crimes commonly require 
proof of facts that even guilty defendants may not know, such as the actions 
of co-conspirators, the value of stolen goods, an action’s effect on interstate 
commerce, and the presence or purity of certain drugs.44 
Defendants’ need to understand the strength of the government’s case 
goes even further. Plea bargaining cannot result in similar outcomes across 
similar cases unless defendants have a reasonably equal opportunity to 
assess their likely chance of conviction. Two similarly situated defendants 
with different amounts of information about their case will calculate their 
chances of conviction differently. That difference is arbitrary to the extent 
that it arises from two different prosecutors who exercise their standardless 
discretion over discovery differently.45 
A third reason to inform the defense of the prosecution’s case is to 
make the adversary system work.46 That system should allow the defense to 
prepare to test the admissibility and strength of the prosecution’s evidence. 
A common objection is that defendants know their own trial defense and 
are in large measure not required to disclose it to the prosecution. Why 
should the prosecution have to reveal its hand to the defense and not the 
 
43 Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal 
Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 
531 (1998). 
44 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2004) (enhanced penalties for embezzling goods worth 
over $1,000); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2010) (mandatory minimum penalties for specified 
quantities and purities of specified drugs); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 
(2013). 
45 Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 61, 69 (2015). 
46 See Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 
IND. L.J. 845, 875 & n.219 (1995) (discussing the place of the adversary system in 
constitutional law). 
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other way around? The response is, without some advance knowledge of 
the case, the defense cannot adequately prepare to do this job. The 
government conducts the investigation and usually has most of the trial 
evidence. Defense attorneys are, in general, underfunded and under-
resourced.47 In general, liberal pre-plea discovery is necessary to let the 
defense put up a fair fight.48 To the extent that the defense has asymmetrical 
discovery obligations, that asymmetry is rooted in the defendant’s right 
against self-incrimination, a structural check itself on executive power. 
Rule 16 does a reasonably good job in the trial context of fulfilling the 
foremost purpose of our criminal procedure—to get at the truth of the 
matter through adversary litigation,49 although other interests (such as 
privileges and efficiency) occasionally trump. The defense needs ample 
discovery for there to be a real clash of ideas leading to the truth. The 
Supreme Court endorsed this notion in Wardius v. Oregon.50 There, the 
Court approved of an Oregon rule requiring defendants to give notice to the 
prosecution of an alibi defense.51 The Court commended the rule, although 
due process did not require it, because it was “based on the proposition that 
the ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery 
which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information with 
which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise 
at trial.”52 Plea bargaining eliminates the jury trial, but the parties’ 
adversarial plea negotiations perform a similar function. Although the 
Supreme Court has held that there is no general right to discovery, Justice 
Douglas, joined by two other Justices dissenting from a denial of certiorari, 
wrote in 1973 that due process at trial required a “full and fair presentation 
of all the relevant evidence which bears upon the guilt of the defendant.”53 
A fourth reason to allow broad pre-plea discovery is that defendants 
need enough inculpatory information to understand the likely sentencing 
 
47 NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 2 (2009), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf. 
48 Of course this is not true in all cases. For this reason, I advocate a regime of 
presumptive early discovery, but the prosecution could in appropriate cases make a showing 
of good cause for a court order delaying such discovery, such as where it would give the 
defense an undue strategic advantage or cause an undue administrative drag. 
49 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 
(1998). 
50 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
51 Id. at 473–74. 
52 Id. at 473. 
53 Neely v. Pennsylvania, 411 U.S. 954, 958 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial 
of cert.) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963)). 
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consequences of a plea. Sentencing information, including expert reports, 
scientific tests, and documentation of criminal history, is often within the 
prosecutor’s exclusive control. Without it, the defense may not be able to 
calculate the possible sentencing consequences of a guilty plea. The 
Sentencing Guidelines are rife with facts that, although not necessarily 
within the defendant’s ken, make a huge difference at sentencing.54 
I now deal with three more common objections to broad pre-plea 
discovery of inculpatory evidence. First, if defendants who go to trial face 
substantial uncertainty regarding the strength of the government’s case, 
why should plea bargaining defendants be entitled to more certainty? True, 
defendants who go to trial take a substantial risk as to who will actually 
testify, how those witnesses will perform, and how the jury will consider 
that evidence. They likewise take their chances as to how the judge will 
exercise her discretion at sentencing. And plea bargaining defendants will 
always face uncertainty as they try to weigh a plea offer against their best 
guess as to the likely trial outcome.55 
However, this criticism assumes that jury trials are the baseline against 
which plea bargaining should be measured. That assumption is wrong: 
given the fact that nearly all convictions result from plea bargains (which 
are to some extent coerced by the threat of a trial penalty), the new baseline 
is not trial outcomes. Rather, it is bargained-for convictions.56 A key goal of 
sentencing is to treat like defendants alike,57 and one way to do that is to 
make sure that similarly situated defendants are protected by uniform rules 
of pre-plea discovery. The more informed they are about their cases, the 
more likely they will be to bargain for similar plea deals. Unavoidable 
randomness in trial outcomes does not excuse avoidable randomness in the 
plea process. The public benefits from distributively just sentencing 
because it promotes confidence in the system.58 
 
54 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2013) (drug quantity); 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (2012) (fraud loss amount); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(2) (2011) (number of aliens smuggled); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2013) (in jointly undertaken activity, 
defendant liable for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance 
of the jointly undertaken criminal activity”). 
55 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2528–29 (2004). 
56 When every customer at the car dealership gets a “discount,” nobody thinks that the 
full sticker price is the true price of the car. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 
1138 (2011). 
57 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012) (there should be no “unwarranted sentence disparities” 
in sentencing). 
58 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012) (Sentencing Commission should seek to avoid unwarranted 
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A second objection to broad pre-plea discovery is that the social cost 
of providing it is too high. There are several bases for this objection: 
prosecutors are wasting their time by putting together extensive disclosures 
for cases that will not be going to trial; broad discovery helps guilty 
defendants manufacture more convincing alibis; and the disclosures may 
give the defense the opportunity to improperly influence or even threaten 
government witnesses. Although there is little empirical data concerning the 
effect of broad discovery on guilty plea rates, anecdotal evidence suggests 
the following benefits of broad pre-plea discovery: it allows defendants to 
better understand the strength of the government’s case against them and 
results in them pleading guilty earlier in the case; it reduces the need for 
formal discovery motions; it eliminates disagreements over what evidence 
is subject to disclosure; it reduces costs throughout the system of prolonged 
pre-trial litigation over cases that ultimately result in guilty pleas; it reduces 
the likelihood of wrongful convictions.59 
A third objection is that prosecutors already have an incentive to share 
 
disparities among similarly situated defendants); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 
(1996) (guidelines should “reduce unjustified disparities and so reach toward the 
evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of 
justice”); Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 
U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 750 (2006) (discussing importance of uniform sentencing); Wes R. 
Porter, The Pendulum in Federal Sentencing Can Also Swing Toward Predictability: A 
Renewed Role for Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 469, 
474 (2011) (discussing importance of evenhanded sentencing); Mosi Secret, Wide 
Sentencing Disparity Found Among U.S. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A23 (wide 
sentencing disparities discredit the system), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/nyregion
/wide-sentencing-disparity-found-among-us-judges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Sentencing 
Bias, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://www.eji.org/raceandpoverty/sentencingbias 
(sentencing disparities tend to disfavor minorities). 
59 See, e.g., CENTER FOR PROSECUTORIAL INTEGRITY, ROADMAP FOR PROSECUTOR 
REFORM 11 (2013) (“Prosecutors in jurisdictions with open-file discovery have found that 
cases can be resolved earlier in the process because defendants can see the strength of the 
state’s case.”); TEXAS APPLESEED & TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, IMPROVING DISCOVERY IN 
CRIMINAL CASES IN TEXAS: HOW BEST PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER JUSTICE 1–5 
(2013); Don DeGabrielle & Mitch Neurock, Federal Criminal Prosecutions: A View from 
the Inside of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, 43 HOUS. LAW. 32 (Dec. 2005) (modified open-file 
discovery policy in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas 
results in more guilty pleas); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1533, 1558 (2010); Voices from the Field: An Inter-Professional Approach to 
Managing Critical Information, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2037, 2074–77 (2010) (anecdotal 
experiences with open-file discovery policies suggest that they make the plea bargaining 
process more efficient); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and 
Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943, 1951 (2010) 
(“Contrary to fears and expectations of individual prosecutors in his office, the [open-file 
discovery] policy has enhanced effective guilty pleas and improved relationships among 
counsel.”). 
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inculpatory information with the defense to incentivize a guilty plea.60 
Unfortunately, the prosecutor’s incentives in plea bargaining do not 
necessarily coincide with the defense’s need for adequate discovery. 
Prosecutors do have an enormous incentive to obtain guilty pleas in most of 
their cases simply because it would be impossible to try very many of those 
cases. To obtain those pleas, prosecutors routinely give over a great deal of 
discovery. Nevertheless, that discovery is often insufficient to ensure that 
the adversary system functions well and consistently. As stated above, 
prosecutors are not always good at identifying exculpatory evidence. 
Although the safest way to avoid a Brady violation is to turn over broad 
discovery, this approach entails higher administrative costs and may even 
jeopardize witnesses. Thus, prosecutors may elect to turn over only that 
information that they think necessary to incentivize a guilty plea.61 
Unfortunately, if disclosures of exculpatory evidence are not complete, 
factually innocent defendants may feel forced to plead guilty. Even if 
inculpatory evidence is not turned over in a timely manner, problems at 
sentencing can arise. If the prosecution puts previously undisclosed 
inculpatory evidence before the sentencing court in an attempt to increase 
the sentence, the defendant may attempt to withdraw his guilty plea or 
argue that the court should reject the plea agreement.62 
C. STRUCTURAL CRITERIA FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CHECKING 
THE EXECUTIVE BY PROVIDING INFORMATION TO ARTICLE III 
DECISION-MAKERS 
This section builds on the prior two to consider the structure of pre-
plea criminal discovery: why criminal procedure should ensure that Article 
III decision-makers—the judge and jury—have sufficient information. This 
is accomplished by providing adequate information to the defense, which 
inherently constrains the executive. In trial-based procedure, the defense 
prepares for trial based on discovery provided by the prosecution and 
presents favorable information to the jury and sentencing judge, who are 
aided in their task by competing prosecution and defense narratives.63 
 
60 Douglass, supra note 32, at 505–06. 
61 Cf. Francis v. State, 428 S.W.3d 850, 856–59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (affirming trial 
court’s decision not to exclude machete that prosecutor failed to disclose before trial, but 
suggesting in dicta that, had the defendant foregone a favorable plea bargain because he 
lacked knowledge of the machete, there might have been a due process violation). 
62 FED R. CRIM. P. 11(c) and (d). 
63 Of course, the need for a defense “narrative” does not shift the burden of proof; the 
defense may simply explain to the jury that the prosecution has failed to prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Likewise, in plea bargaining procedure, the defendant cannot intelligently 
decide whether to convict himself without adequate information upon 
which to formulate a defense. In the following two sub-sections I consider 
the constitutional, structural reasons for constraining prosecutorial 
discretion and providing adequate information to the defense. 
1. Constraining Prosecutorial Discretion 
The Constitution’s structure and several of its provisions suggest the 
importance of separation of powers for the criminal justice system. First, 
Articles I, II, and III describe the tripartite branches: legislative, executive, 
and judicial. Modern criminal procedure evinces a “street-level” version of 
separation of powers: a conviction requires prosecutors (the executive 
branch) to charge a violation of law (defined by the legislature) to initiate 
proceedings presided over by a judge (the judicial branch).64 Thus, as 
explained in Professor Rachel E. Barkow’s seminal article Separation of 
Powers and the Criminal Law (cited by the Supreme Court), a concurrence 
of each governmental branch is required for a conviction.65 
The trial jury provides a populist structural check on this concurrence 
of the tripartite branches.66 Both the Sixth Amendment and Article III67 
require that a criminal conviction have the trial jury’s judgment of guilt. 
(Thus, whether the jury is considered to be an Article III body or an extra-
governmental body—or both—it must be considered as a structural 
constitutional institution that checks the tripartite branches.)68 
Two opposing, yet complementary, principles underlie our separation 
of powers scheme: inefficiency and efficiency. Efficiency is necessary for 
 
64 The office of federal prosecutor was created in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Private 
parties have at times had authority to bring prosecutions, but in practice rarely exercise this 
right. 
65 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1012–20 (2006) (cited in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012)). 
66 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1015. I leave the grand jury aside in this Article because pre-plea 
discovery is typically a post-indictment issue. However, for defendants that plead guilty pre-
indictment, the same analysis applies: in waiving the structural protection of the grand jury, 
they effectively act as their own grand jury and therefore need, all things being equal, as 
much information as a grand jury would have had in making a probable cause determination. 
67 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in 
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . . .”). 
68 Arguably, the public and press are a fifth structure, an additional check on the 
tripartite branches. The Sixth Amendment requires that the jury trial be public, and the First 
Amendment provides for freedom of the press. One principle behind this seems to be 
transparency in criminal justice, but I leave this structural argument for future scholarly 
work. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2177 (2014). 
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the operation of government and calls for allocating power to government 
actors in the criminal justice system most institutionally fit to exercise that 
power, and preventing coordinate branches from intruding upon that 
domain.69 For example, the executive branch has broad discretion about 
what discovery to provide to the defense. This is because the prosecution 
possesses the contents of the investigation in the first place and is most 
familiar with it. Therefore, efficiency seemingly dictates that the 
prosecution should make discovery determinations. 
Of course, this conception of efficiency is limited: the “efficient” 
operation of prosecutors does not necessarily result in the socially optimal 
outcome. In fact, “inefficiency” (again, in the separation of powers sense) 
with its slow pace and complicated procedures, often improves social 
outcomes. In criminal justice matters, the principle of inefficiency seeks to 
curb the consolidation and abuse of official power by separating powers. 
For example, there cannot in theory be a conviction without the concurrence 
of the tripartite branches and the jury. Of course, no workable system of 
government can result from completely separated powers; the Constitution 
is instead based on checks and balances.70 Under checks and balances, each 
branch should perform only its assigned functions, subject to checks from 
the other branches. 
An important corollary is, because the executive’s duty is especially 
susceptible to abuse, the legislature and courts should exercise special 
oversight. For example, in Brady, the Supreme Court held that due process 
requires prosecutors to provide the defense with material exculpatory 
evidence in time to make use of that evidence at the jury trial and 
sentencing.71 Structurally, such a rule checks prosecutors by taking the 
narrative out of their hands and, through the defense, empowering the jury 
and judge with necessary information to arrive at a result more independent 
from the prosecutor’s version of events. 
Another principle of inefficiency related to separation of powers is 
separation of personnel.72 No one actor should perform the work assigned to 
two or more branches (e.g., an executive officer may not perform legislative 
 
69 See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756–58 (1996) (discussing principal 
rationales for separation of powers). 
70 M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 607–08 (2001); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in 
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1167–68 (2000). 
71 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
72 Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of 
Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1048 n.11, 1090 (1994). 
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or judicial functions).73 This curbs partiality and self-interest. This is one of 
the principle ethical difficulties that prosecutors face. Their role is quasi-
judicial in that they must even-handedly enforce the law. Doing so requires 
them to think like judges or defense attorneys, such as when they determine 
what information in their possession could be exculpatory. At the same 
time, their role is adversarial, in that they can’t enforce the law without 
pushing back on the defense.74 
Separation of powers is a useful criterion for evaluating criminal 
procedure. A criminal justice system without separation of powers 
protections would violate our notions of fundamental fairness, in part 
because the separation of powers is baked into our constitutional order and 
because we are suspicious of putting too much power in any one 
governmental actor or institution.75 Although separation of powers 
principles alone are not sufficient to help us to strike the right balance of 
power in pre-plea discovery, these principles strongly suggest that 
prosecutors should not have unchecked discretion to withhold pre-plea 
discovery. Judges need clear pre-plea discovery rules that are enforceable 
before defendants plead guilty. This is an important element of the 
balancing test discussed in Part III(C) below. 
2. Informing Article III Decision-Makers 
A second key principle of this structural critique is that Article III 
decision-makers cannot perform their functions effectively without 
adequate information. A jury cannot properly adjudicate without hearing 
adequate evidence through the adversary procedure. And a judge cannot 
preside over the case and pronounce a just sentence without access to 
information that goes beyond even what the jury hears. The structural 
implication of uninformed judges and juries is clear: if they cannot properly 
 
73 Montesquieu famously argued for both separation of powers and persons. See Steven 
G. Calabresi, Mark E. Berghausen & Skylar Albertson, The Rise and Fall of the Separation 
of Powers, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 527, 534 & n.39 (2012). 
74 See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States 
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the 
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike 
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one.”). 
75 Separation of powers can be viewed as a necessary component of due process, but 
that doctrinal argument is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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perform their roles, they cannot restrain executive discretion. This is 
important to pre-plea discovery because defendants who plead guilty 
effectively act as their own judges and juries, and they need to be properly 
informed in order to carry out those roles. 
Of course, in an important sense, prosecutors themselves are acting as 
the judge and jury when they use the trial penalty to pressure defendants 
into waiving the structural protections of an involved judge and a trial jury. 
But even defendants who plead guilty under pressure are ultimately 
exercising some degree of agency, albeit a reduced one. To the extent that 
defendants have any agency in the decision, it makes sense to refer to them 
as their own judge and jury and to consider whether they have adequate 
information to act as such. 
Juries need adequate evidence upon which to perform their Article III 
function of deciding between innocence and guilt. They have no 
investigative function and thus rely on the prosecution and the defense for a 
complete adversarial presentation.76 The breath of that presentation allows 
them to adjudicate “on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the 
truth.”77 
The sentencing judge needs even more information than the jury.78 The 
Federal Rules of Evidence place no limits on the information that a judge 
considers at sentencing.79 For example, federal sentencing is a “real 
offense” regime, which permits judges to look beyond the facts of the crime 
of conviction to consider all “relevant conduct” in sentencing, as well as 
broad information about the defendant’s own background and 
characteristics.80 Federal judges must consider a broad variety of 
 
76 Christopher Deal, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to Disclose 
and the Right to A Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1810 (2007). 
77 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900–01 (1984) (quoting Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969)); see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (“Court 
proceedings are held for the solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth which is 
the sine qua non of a fair trial.”). The process by which juries adjudicate must comport with 
due process, both for the defendant’s and the public’s sake, because the public has a strong 
interest in accurate and fair adjudication. “[T]he sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, 
must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 
358 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
78 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (“[B]oth before and since the 
American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy 
under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of 
evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed 
within limits fixed by law.”). 
79 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012); FED. R. EVID. 1101(d). 
80 Williams, 337 U.S. at 249–51; 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 26.4(b); cf. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2013). 
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information at sentencing consistent with the broad considerations inherent 
in sentencing.81 Federal probation reports must reflect this broad variety of 
sentencing information.82 Defendants have due process rights to receive 
notice of the information to be considered,83 and also that the information 
received be accurate.84 
Again, to the extent that plea bargains do away with jury trials and 
largely determine sentences, the structural principle of restraining the 
executive by providing sufficient information to plea bargaining defendants 
 
81 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (The court must consider “(1) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need 
for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect 
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence 
to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; (D) and 
to provide the defendant with needed . . . training . . . [and] treatment[.]”). 
82 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d). 
83 The probation report must be disclosed to the defendant. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(2). 
Certain information must be excluded from the report, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(3), but the 
defendant must be given notice of such information and reasonable opportunity to comment 
before sentence is pronounced. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(1)(B); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING, Standard 18-5.7 (3d ed. 1994). Courts must state the 
reasons for imposing a particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012). “We conclude that 
petitioner was denied due process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at least in 
part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.” Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court has not made clear 
whether due process or some other constitutional principle (like Eighth Amendment 
protections against cruel and unusual punishment) require that the defendant receive notice 
of all information used against him in sentencing. Compare id. at 351 (plurality opinion) 
(relying on due process) with id. at 364 (White, J., concurring) (relying on Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments); see also 6 LAFAVE ET AL., 
supra note 29, § 26.4(d). Defendants in capital cases have no right to receive discovery of 
sentencing information in advance of sentencing. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 167–68 
(1996) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (no general right of 
discovery in criminal cases)) (noting that the Gray defendant had opportunity at sentencing 
to confront and cross-examine); 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 26.4(d). 
84 In Townsend v. Burke, the defendant pleaded guilty to serious felony charges without 
the benefit of counsel and received a stiff sentence based in part on “materially untrue” 
information about the defendant’s criminal history. The Supreme Court found a violation of 
due process. 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948). Without properly informed defense counsel, the 
adversarial process failed, and the resulting sentence was based on misinformation. 
Likewise, in United States v. Tucker, the judge had enhanced the defendant’s sentence based 
on two prior convictions that proved to have been unconstitutionally obtained. 404 U.S. 443, 
447 (1972). Relying on Townsend, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s order 
that the defendant be resentenced without reference to the infirm convictions, because the 
original sentence had been “founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional 
magnitude.” Id. Taken together, Townsend and Tucker “stand for the general proposition that 
a criminal defendant has the due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate 
information.” Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss, 540 F.3d 542, 554 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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is necessary in designing any fair and effective pre-plea discovery regime. 
This is accounted for in the balancing test discussed below in Part III(C). 
In summary, prosecutors should provide the defense with broad pre-
plea discovery of both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence. If Article III 
decision-makers need such information for trial, then the defendant needs it 
for plea bargaining. Moreover, federal prosecutors should not be required or 
trusted to turn over all of this discovery on their own. They need to be 
regulated by courts and Congress. In Part II, I argue that the Supreme 
Court’s discovery cases have not recognized the structural problems in a 
system where prosecutors are too powerful and plea bargaining defendants 
are often under-informed. 
II. A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S CRIMINAL 
DISCOVERY JURISPRUDENCE 
The intellectual roots of due process are intertwined with separation of 
powers ideas: the state (executive) should not adjudicate and punish except 
by neutral decision-makers (judge and juries) applying the settled law of the 
land. This Article’s structural critique highlights two key aspects of this 
idea. First, such an arrangement is intended in part to curb the abuse of 
executive power. Second, the decision-maker cannot render an appropriate 
judgment and sentence without adequate information. That information 
typically reaches the decision-maker through the adversary process, coming 
from both the prosecution and the defense. I call this the due process 
principle of adequate information to the decision-maker (“information 
principle” or “information right”). Although this information principle is 
usually framed as a due process right of defendants, the public also has a 
compelling interest in adequately informed Article III decision-makers. 
The Brady rule, discussed in Part II(B), infra, is consistent with these 
principles. First, although it limits prosecutors’ discretion to withhold 
material, exculpatory evidence, that limitation is weak because Brady 
violations can only be assessed from a post-trial point of view. Second, 
Brady’s rationale of providing a fair trial through the proper functioning of 
the adversary system is consistent with the principle of providing adequate 
information to the jury and sentencing judge. However, Brady does not 
extend to apparently inculpatory evidence that might be relevant and helpful 
to the defense at trial. 
The Supreme Court has decided many due process cases relating to 
criminal discovery but outside of Brady’s direct progeny. Part II(C), infra, 
discusses how, in many instances, those cases have done better at 
restraining executive authority and providing adequate information to the 
decision-maker. 
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As shown in Part II(D), infra, due process is not the only constitutional 
source of discovery rights. The Supreme Court has also considered 
discovery issues under the Compulsory Process Clause.85 In fact, discovery 
issues have arisen under several other trial-related Sixth Amendment rights. 
This Article’s structural critique is applicable to all discovery cases, 
regardless of their constitutional “hook.” In fact, the Supreme Court has 
sometimes paid more attention to the structural implications of its discovery 
rules in its compulsory process cases than in its due process cases. 
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DUE PROCESS 
The Supreme Court’s discovery jurisprudence has been largely rooted 
in due process, a concept with historical ties to separation of powers.86 
Under the Magna Charta, the king (executive) could not deprive his 
subjects of life, liberty, or property unless the jury assented and the sanction 
followed from the settled law of the land and the common law.87 The Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, at the time of its passage, required the 
same procedural protections.88 Thus, an important meaning of due process 
was a series of restraints on the executive in law enforcement: generalized 
law (either through the legislature or the common law), a neutral judge, and 
a jury.89 
Due process and separation of powers are so closely related that due 
process principles can occasionally be used to decide cases that appear to 
raise only separation of powers questions. For example, in Mistretta v. 
United States, the Supreme Court considered whether, inter alia, the 
President’s removal power of members of the United States Sentencing 
Commission, an agency independent of the judicial branch, violated 
separation of powers.90 The Court held that separation of powers was not 
violated, because the removal power did not risk violating the impartiality 
of the Article III judges on the Commission. Thus, the Court invoked a due 
process principle (the idea of an impartial adjudicator) to decide a 
 
85 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”). 
86 Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1681 (2012). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1679. 
89 In fact, several features of due process relate to the separation of powers: 
fundamental fairness in procedures, impartial decision-makers, transparency and 
accessibility of government processes, and respect for separation of powers as a structural 
limit on government authority. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE 
PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 218–19 (2013). 
90 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
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separation of powers question.91 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not always acknowledged the 
close relationship between due process and separation of powers.92 As 
several scholars have already noted, this oversight has resulted in due 
process jurisprudence that fails to adequately restrain the executive.93 For 
example, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
broad prosecutorial charging discretion “carries with it the potential for both 
individual and institutional abuse.”94 But where prosecutors threatened to 
bring charges carrying long mandatory minimum penalties for defendants 
who did not plead guilty to lesser charges, the Court found no due process 
violation.95 Bordenkircher stands for a narrow conception of due process 
that is not offended when the executive threatens a trial penalty to 
incentivize and even coerce defendants to waive a jury trial, even though 
that very trial is supposed to check the executive’s power.96 Deciding the 
case on these separation of powers principles would have led to a more just 
result. 
B. THE BRADY RULE 
This section describes how the Brady rule provides defendants with 
limited structural protections by forcing prosecutors to put key information 
in the hands of the defense. But these protections do not go far enough, 
because Brady only applies to evidence that might have changed the 
outcome of the proceedings from a post-trial (as opposed to a pre-trial) 
perspective, and it applies only to exculpatory evidence, not inculpatory 
evidence. 
In Brady, the prosecutor failed to disclose to Brady his co-defendant’s 
 
91 Id.; see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1513, 1544 (1991). 
92 But see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 815–25 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (due process violated where judges promulgated rule, 
prosecuted its violation, and decided guilt); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522–26, 531–33 
(1927) (due process violated where mayor adjudicated prohibition violations and received 
the fines from those violations). 
93 See supra Part I(A). 
94 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). 
95 Id. at 363. Some scholars have asked whether plea bargaining violates the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the 
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 879 
(2009). 
96 Barkow, supra note 65, at 1046; see also Richard M. Re, The Due Process 
Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1907 (2014) (describing due process as 
adherence to law). 
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statement taking principal responsibility for a murder.97 The Court found a 
due process violation.98 The rule that has emerged from Brady and 
subsequent cases requires prosecutors to turn over evidence to the defense 
that is “material” and exculpatory in time for its use at the jury trial.99 The 
defense need not request the evidence.100 Materiality is measured from a 
post-trial point of view: “The evidence is material only if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different,”101 meaning, the 
jury would not have convicted. This same test applies to sentencing: a 
Brady violation occurs if, had the judge known of the withheld evidence, 
she might have imposed a more lenient sentence.102 
I have already argued above that this rule gives too much discretion to 
prosecutors for withholding pre-plea discovery.103 The Brady rule’s 
unworkability is part of the problem: prosecutors are unable to accurately 
gauge the post-trial materiality of evidence in cases that never go to trial.104 
And asking prosecutors to exercise in such mental gymnastics violates the 
principle of separation of personnel because such prosecutors have to wear 
three hats—their own, the judge’s, and the defense attorney’s—to do so.105 
Finally, prosecutors might rely on the fact that judges will be reluctant to 
find that withheld evidence was “material” on appeal because doing so may 
upset otherwise valid convictions.106 
Brady’s rationale is rooted in two interdependent purposes. The 
procedural purpose is avoiding an unfair trial through the provision of 
 
97 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). 
98 Id. at 86. 
99 “Due process, it is said, requires only that disclosure of exculpatory evidence be 
made in sufficient time to permit defendant to make effective use of that evidence at trial.” 6 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 24.3(b) & n.63 (citing lower court cases, no Supreme Court 
case law); see, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“Disclosure, to escape the Brady sanction, must be made at a time when the disclosure 
would be of value to the accused.”). Although Brady was decided under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court’s discovery jurisprudence has treated 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as co-extensive. See United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 
100 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107–08. 
101 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
102 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88. 
103 See supra Part I(A). 
104 See supra Part I(C)(2). 
105 See supra Part I(C)(2). 
106 See John G. Douglass, Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady v. Maryland and Plea 
Bargaining, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 589 (2007). 
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exculpatory evidence.107 The substantive purpose is preventing the innocent 
from being convicted:108 
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal 
trials are fair [procedural purpose]; our system of the administration of 
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. . . . A prosecution that 
withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, 
would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that 
bears heavily on the defendant [substantive purpose].109 
Because Brady ultimately asks how the withheld evidence would have 
affected the relevant decision-maker—the jury as to guilt or innocence, and 
the judge at sentencing—it means that due process is denied if the decision-
makers are unaware of material, exculpatory evidence. 
There is a structural rationale behind this due process rule. Judges and 
juries make decisions based on the evidence and information before them, 
and in an adversary system, the defense is responsible for presenting this 
exculpatory information to the court. The Brady rule protects the integrity 
of the adversary system by enabling the defense to make that 
presentation.110 By considering competing prosecution and defense 
narratives, judges and juries make independent decisions about innocence, 
guilt, and sentencing. Thus, Brady structurally checks prosecutors by 
forcing them to share the power of shaping the narrative with the defense 
and ultimately to empower Article III decision-makers to arrive at a 
conclusion independent of the prosecution’s story line.111 
Unfortunately, Brady’s structural protections are limited. Justice 
Marshall, dissenting in Bagley, argued that Brady materiality should be 
determined from a pre-trial point of view. Under his proposed test, the 
prosecutor should “disclose all evidence in his files that might reasonably 
 
107 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). 
108 Id. at 86; see Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the 
Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 77, 127 (2013) (contrasting 
Brady’s substantive focus of protecting the innocent with its procedural focus of ensuring a 
fair trial). 
109 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88. 
110 Deal, supra note 76, at 1809–10. 
111 Id. at 1810 n.165 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995)). “The Court’s 
standard also encourages the prosecutor to assume the role of the jury, and to decide whether 
certain evidence will make a difference. In our system of justice, that decision properly and 
wholly belongs to the jury. The prosecutor, convinced of the guilt of the defendant and of the 
truthfulness of his witnesses, may all too easily view as irrelevant or unpersuasive evidence 
that draws his own judgments into question. Accordingly he will decide the evidence need 
not be disclosed. But the ideally neutral trier of fact, who approaches the case from a wholly 
different perspective, is by the prosecutor’s decision denied the opportunity to consider the 
evidence.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 702 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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be considered favorable to the defendant’s case.”112 This broader reading of 
materiality would improve the functioning of the adversary system by 
helping the defense to prepare for trial or plea bargaining. But courts have 
not been willing to extend Brady’s due process protections to questions of 
pre-trial materiality,113 although I will show below in Part II(C) that the 
Court has done so in other due process cases outside the Brady line. 
One significant exception to Brady’s post-trial materiality 
determination can be found in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, which approved of a 
procedure allowing trial courts to make a pre-trial determination of Brady 
materiality.114 In that case, Pennsylvania enacted a law protecting the 
confidentiality of Child and Youth Services files unless the trial court 
ordered disclosure of those files. In a prosecution of Ritchie for child abuse, 
the Supreme Court held that the trial court should have examined Child and 
Youth Services files in camera for Brady material and turned those 
materials over to defendant. Ritchie presents a solution to the structural 
problem of prosecutors unilaterally choosing to withhold discovery. In 
practice, where federal prosecutors face a close call over whether evidence 
is material and exculpatory and they decide not to turn it over, they 
frequently submit it to the trial judge for in camera review, seeking a 
finding that the evidence is not material or exculpatory.115 
In contrast to Brady’s rule regarding exculpatory evidence, the 
Supreme Court has refused to find a due process right to inculpatory 
evidence. In Weatherford v. Bursey, Weatherford and Bursey committed a 
crime together, but Bursey didn’t realize that Weatherford was a police 
operative.116 Weatherford testified against Bursey at the bench trial and 
Bursey was convicted. Bursey never knew that Weatherford would be a 
prosecution witness. The Supreme Court held that, because there was “no 
general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case,” the 
prosecution’s failure to reveal the identity of this key inculpatory witness 
did not violate Brady.117 The fact that Bursey might have opted for a plea 
bargain had he known in advance of Weatherford’s testimony was likewise 
 
112 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 699–702 (citing examples of evidence which is helpful to the 
defense but not material). 
113 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 24.3(b) & n.63 (collecting lower court cases); 
accord Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559–61 (1977). For scholarly commentary, see 
6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29. 
114 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58–60 (1987). 
115 Such orders are believed to insulate prosecutors from bar disciplinary proceedings 
and, to some extent, from appellate findings of an unintentional Brady violation. 
116 Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 548. 
117 Id. at 559. 
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immaterial, because there was “no constitutional right to plea bargain.”118 
Thus, the Court’s due process jurisprudence has not conferred a 
general right to discovery of inculpatory evidence.119 This limitation is 
unwise for two structural reasons. First, prosecutors have too much 
unregulated discretion not to turn over discovery that is relevant to the 
preparation of the defense. Second, if the defense is unprepared, both the 
judge and the jury may be deprived of an effective adversarial presentation 
necessary for proper adjudication of guilt and sentencing. 
C. OTHER RIGHT TO INFORMATION CASES ARISING UNDER DUE 
PROCESS 
This section considers other due process cases outside the Brady line 
that articulate a more robust pre-trial (and potentially pre-plea) conception 
of the right to information. 
1. Executive Duty to Preserve Evidence for Fact-Finder’s Benefit—
California v. Trombetta 
The Supreme Court has upheld the principle of providing broad 
information to the defense—even beyond that which is material and 
exculpatory—in its due process jurisprudence about the duty to preserve 
evidence. In California v. Trombetta, the Court held that law enforcement 
agencies, acting in good faith and according to established policies, did not 
need to preserve breath samples in driving under the influence of alcohol 
investigations in order for their analysis of those samples to be admissible. 
However, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the state in its 
investigation had a duty to preserve evidence that “might be expected to 
play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.”120 
The Trombetta Court placed its holding within a “group of 
constitutional privileges,” including Brady, that give defendants access to 
exculpatory evidence.121 However, Trombetta should in theory give the 
defense broader access to information than Brady. Because Trombetta 
concerned investigations before criminal proceedings were instituted, the 
Court articulated a materiality standard based on evidence’s potential value 
to the defense at the time the evidence could be preserved. That is, in 
contrast to Brady’s post-trial materiality standard, Trombetta tests 
materiality at the time of the investigation, typically before charges are 
 
118 Id. at 561. 
119 See infra Part III(B) (discussing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002)). 
120 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). 
121 Id. at 485. 
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filed. 
True, Trombetta is deferential to the executive’s good faith decisions, 
which may limit its actual benefit to defendants.122 However, Trombetta 
also strengthens the due process right “that criminal defendants be afforded 
a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”123 because it 
requires the executive to preserve evidence that is not necessarily 
exculpatory but only “potentially exculpatory.”124 The executive is not left 
guessing as to the ultimate materiality of any evidence but instead asks the 
more immediately relevant question of whether it “might be expected to 
play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.”125 More information is 
likely to flow to the defense under this rule. This checks the executive by 
helping defendants to investigate and prepare their defense, ultimately 
resulting in more information and a richer competing narrative for the judge 
and jury.126 
2. Right to “Raw Materials Integral to the Building of an Effective 
Defense”—Ake v. Oklahoma127 
In Ake v. Oklahoma, an indigent defendant was tried on capital 
charges.128 The judge rejected Ake’s pre-trial request for a court-appointed 
psychologist, and the jury subsequently rejected Ake’s bare-bones insanity 
defense. Applying the due process balancing test set forth in Eldridge,129 the 
Supreme Court found a due process violation.130 Indigent defendants were 
entitled to equal justice,131 and the adversary system could not function 
 
122 The Court strengthened the good faith requirement in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 
U.S. 51, 58 (1988). 
123 Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485. 
124 Id. at 481. 
125 Id. at 488–89 (1984) (stating that potentially exculpatory evidence “must both 
possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of 
such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other 
reasonably available means”) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109–10 (1976)). 
126 In reasoning that echoes Trombetta, some courts have also imposed a limited due 
process-based duty on prosecutors to create evidence in the form of a pre-trial lineup that 
could potentially exculpate the accused. See People v. Mena, 277 P.3d 160, 165 (Cal. 2012). 
There is no universal constitutional right for the prosecution to arrange such a lineup. See id. 
(collecting cases). However, some lower courts have held that the trial judge has discretion 
to grant one “if the request is made promptly after the crime or arrest” and the lineup “may 
be of value to both sides.” United States v. Estremera, 531 F.2d 1103, 1111 (2d Cir. 1976). 
127 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
128 Id. at 72. 
129 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see infra Part III(A). 
130 Ake, 470 U.S. at 74. 
131 Id. at 76. 
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properly if the defendant lacked “access to the raw materials integral to the 
building of an effective defense.”132 In this way, the appointment of the 
psychologist would have been a safeguard to “diminish the risk of 
erroneous conviction[s].”133 
Significantly, discovery relating to the court-appointed psychologist 
might have ultimately proved fatal to the defense, but as in Trombetta, the 
concern was with giving the defense access to potentially exculpatory 
evidence, judged from a pre-trial perspective. The more complete the 
prosecution’s disclosures, the better the springboard for the defense’s 
independent investigation. Ake teaches that the adversary system functions 
better if the defense receives information that reasonably appears to be 
necessary for the effective preparation of the defense well in advance of 
trial.134 
3. Right to Information “Relevant and Helpful to the Defense” 
—Roviaro v. United States 
In Roviaro v. United States,135 which preceded Brady, Roviaro was 
tried and convicted on drug charges. A confidential informant had been 
central to the criminal transaction, and Roviaro sought for the government 
to disclose the informant’s true identity. The government asserted that the 
information was privileged, and the judge denied the motion. The Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction and supplied a broad standard to guide the 
trial court’s exercise of discretion to order discovery related to an 
informant. This standard was rooted in fundamental fairness, mandating 
disclosure “[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the 
contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an 
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.”136 The trial court 
should balance the public’s interest in preserving the privilege against the 
defendant’s interest in the evidence.137 
The Roviaro standard of materiality is broader than Brady’s and 
 
132 Id. at 77. 
133 Id. at 78. 
134 Justices Burger (concurring) and Rehnquist (dissenting) would have limited Ake’s 
holding to capital cases. Id. at 87. 
135 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
136 Id. at 60–61. Roviaro relies on “fundamental fairness” without mentioning due 
process. The Supreme Court later clarified that its holding in Roviaro was based on the 
court’s supervisory power. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309 (1967). Later, in California 
v. Trombetta, the Court categorized Roviaro as a case concerning “constitutional privileges” 
alongside other due process-based access-to-evidence cases. 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). 
137 Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62. 
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should result in more information to judges and juries in informant cases. 
First, the required balancing is conducted from a pre-trial perspective.138 
Second, unlike the Brady rule, which is only concerned with evidence, the 
requested discovery here was information that might or might not have led 
to evidence, and that evidence might or might not have been exculpatory. 
Third, Roviaro’s broad conception of the potential materiality of an 
informant’s testimony “to a fair determination of a cause”139 focuses on the 
importance of getting sufficient information to the trier of fact through the 
adversary system. 
D. RIGHT TO INFORMATION CASES NOT ARISING OUT OF DUE 
PROCESS 
1. Compulsory Process for the Effective Functioning of the Courts and 
United States v. Nixon 
The Supreme Court has held that several Sixth Amendment rights 
relate to due process, including “the right to offer the testimony of 
witnesses” and compulsory process.140 Taken together, they comprise “the 
right to present a defense,”141 which is “a fundamental element of due 
process of law.”142 But, logically, the right to present a defense would be 
meaningless if there were no associated right to prepare a defense. Indeed, 
Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged as far back as United States v. Burr 
that compulsory process should provide the accused, before the trial,143 with 
documents that are “really essential to his defence.”144 
In United States v. Nixon, a criminal discovery case arising primarily 
under the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause, the Supreme 
Court employed a separation of powers analysis that depended on the due 
process principle of adequate information to the decision-maker.145 The 
Watergate special prosecutor had sought to subpoena materials from the 
President of the United States under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. (Although a Rule 17 subpoena is not technically a 
 
138 Id. at 65 & n.15. 
139 Id. at 61. 
140 Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). 
144 Id. at 37. 
145 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704, 709 (1974). 
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discovery device,146 it often serves to augment the materials available to a 
defendant under Rule 16, typically by making evidence available from third 
parties.) The materials sought were recordings of conversations between 
President Nixon and the Watergate defendants, and they were expected to 
provide key evidence. Although Nixon concerned discovery for the 
prosecutor, its reasoning was broad enough to encompass discovery from 
the prosecutor, too.147 
The President tried to quash the subpoena, asserting a separation of 
powers argument for a strong executive privilege. The Supreme Court 
rejected that strict separation of powers argument in favor of checks and 
balances. It held that an unqualified presidential privilege in these 
circumstances would “plainly conflict with the function of the courts under 
Art[icle] III”148 and interfere with the Constitution’s clear intent that the 
“dispersed powers” (tripartite branches), though separate in their assigned 
functions, be integrated into a “workable government.”149 
Turning to due process principles, the Court found that the President’s 
privilege needed to be weighed against “the rule of law” and the “need to 
develop all relevant facts in the adversary system.”150 The Court’s analysis 
depended on the due process principle of adequate information to the 
decision-maker through the adversary process: 
The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be 
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very 
integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend 
on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of 
evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of 
courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence 
needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.151 
The Court also emphasized that the subpoenaed materials were needed 
before the trial for “examination and processing” by the special 
 
146 Id. at 698. 
147 Id. at 709. 
148 Id. at 707. 
149 Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)); see generally Brown, supra note 91, at 1562–63. 
150 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708–09. 
151 Id. at 709 (emphasis added); see also Brown, supra note 91, at 1564 (“Recognition 
of an absolute privilege residing in article II would have had tremendous potential to affect 
important individual rights. It would have amounted to the Judiciary’s acquiescing in a 
criminal system which allowed one governmental department both to prosecute a defendant 
and to control his defense. That appears to be just the type of consolidation of power that the 
system of separated powers was intended to thwart.”). 
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prosecutor.152 
Although Nixon addressed compulsory process in the pre-trial context, 
the same principle of access to information could well be applied to pre-
plea criminal discovery. In fact, the Nixon Court specifically stated that 
“[t]he right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial” implicated 
not only the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses but also the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.153 Due process and separation of 
powers were inextricably intertwined, because an excessively strong 
executive privilege that withheld “demonstrably relevant” evidence “would 
cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the 
basic function of the courts.”154 
The Court invoked an ancient maxim in favor of expansive 
compulsory process-based discovery: “‘the public . . . has a right to every 
man’s evidence,’ except for those persons protected by a constitutional, 
common-law, or statutory privilege . . . .”155 Although the Court has not 
used such expansive language in the discovery context, it has applied this 
same principle to grand jury subpoenas and congressional subpoenas.156 
Such an expansive discovery principle calls not for exculpatory evidence 
but for “relevant” evidence for the parties to use in the trial preparations. 
In another case, the Supreme Court relied on both compulsory process 
and due process to uphold the principle that the jury cannot perform its 
truth-seeking function without a robust defense right to present evidence. In 
Webb v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that due process was denied where 
the trial judge effectively dissuaded a defense witness from testifying.157 
This also violated the right to present a defense through compulsory 
process: 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their 
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the 
right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the 
prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.158 
This compulsory process right to prepare a defense is designed to 
 
152 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 702 (citing Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 
(1951)). 
153 Id. at 711. 
154 Id. at 712. 
155 Id. at 709 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)). 
156 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (same principle applied to grand jury subpoenas); 
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (same principle applied to congressional 
subpoenas). 
157 Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (per curiam). 
158 Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)). 
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check the prosecution by not letting it control the defense case.159 The right 
must attach before the trial because the defendant cannot always know that 
a witness is “in his favor” without some pre-trial discovery.160 Both the 
Compulsory Process Clause and the Due Process Clauses can be applied to 
criminal discovery.161 One scholar has proposed a theory under which due 
process should decide some kinds of discovery cases and compulsory 
process should decide other kinds.162 For the purposes of this Article, 
though, it is enough to say that my structural critique extends to discovery 
cases arising under due process or compulsory process or, as in Nixon, both. 
2. Other Potential Constitutional Sources of Discovery Rights 
There may be other clauses in the Constitution that could serve as the 
basis for broader discovery rights. For example, the Sixth Amendment right 
to assistance of counsel includes the right to be advised of “the advantages 
and disadvantages of a plea agreement.”163 However, without adequate 
discovery, defense counsel can’t always adequately investigate the case to 
evaluate potential plea agreements.164 Thus, some scholars have argued that 
pre-plea discovery is necessary to effectuate defense counsel’s Sixth 
Amendment duty to investigate and provide competent advice.165 They have 
even argued that this defense duty may be impossible to effectively carry 
out with a corresponding prosecution duty to provide broad discovery.166 
The accused also has a Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation.”167 Rooted in that clause, the bill of 
particulars has in times past been used as a discovery device. Although the 
bill of particulars could serve as a vehicle for court-ordered pre-plea 
 
159 Montoya, supra note 46, at 863–64; Brown, supra note 91, at 1564. 
160 Montoya, supra note 46, at 867; cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–71 (1932) 
(defense counsel cannot be effective at trial without the opportunity to prepare for trial). 
161 For example, in Ritchie, the Supreme Court applied due process to a discovery issue 
but could just as well have analyzed the problem under compulsory process. See 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987). 
162 See Montoya, supra note 46, at 873–78. 
163 Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995). 
164 Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to 
Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1103 
(2004); see also Lain, supra note 22, at 17. 
165 Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 
595, 611–12 (2013). 
166 Id. 
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. “[T]he Constitution does not address criminal discovery 
rights.” John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2097, 2176 n.333 (2000). 
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discovery, it has fallen out of favor.168 Likewise, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the due process notice requirement to refer only to notice of the 
charge itself and not the evidentiary support for that charge.169 
The Sixth Amendment right to confront government witnesses 
arguably cannot be effective without sufficient discovery. However, the 
Supreme Court has refused to recognize a right of discovery within the 
Confrontation Clause, with a plurality in Ritchie holding instead that 
confrontation is strictly a trial right.170 
Finally, pre-trial suppression motions can be case-dispositive even in 
the plea-bargaining stage. The constitutional requirements for discovery 
relating to such claims are unclear. The Supreme Court has recognized a 
court’s power to order the production of discovery relevant to an equal 
protection claim.171 This power arises under the equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, although courts are split on 
whether such a claim can result in the suppression of evidence.172 Of 
course, the most common basis for pre-trial suppression motions is the 
Fourth Amendment. An argument could be made that the Fourth 
Amendment contains a “hidden” discovery requirement, rooted in due 
process, requiring the provision of evidence necessary for the defense 
preparation of a suppression motion. Ultimately, the Supreme Court is 
unlikely to apply Brady to pre-trial suppression motions because Brady’s 
substantive concern is with accurately sorting the guilty from the innocent, 
not ferreting out law enforcement’s constitutional violations. 
In summary, the information principle, rooted in both separation of 
powers and due process, holds that the executive must be restrained through 
the provision of information to the defense that allows for the adversary 
system to properly function. Unfortunately, the Brady rule embodies the 
information principle in only a limited way, because Brady does not cover 
inculpatory evidence and is only enforceable post-trial. But the Supreme 
Court has given strong expression to this principle throughout its due 
 
168 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f) (“The court may direct the government to file a bill of 
particulars.”); see also United States v. Smith, 16 F.R.D. 372, 374–75 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (bill 
of particulars may be necessary to preparation of the defense). 
169 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 & n.20 (1976); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974) (“We hold that written notice of the charges must be given to the 
disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to 
marshal the facts and prepare a defense.”). 
170 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51–54 (1987) (plurality opinion); cf. id. at 61 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
171 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996). 
172 Brooks Holland, Race and Ambivalent Criminal Procedure Remedies, 47 GONZ. L. 
REV. 341, 349–50 (2012) (collecting cases). 
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process and compulsory process jurisprudence. In Part III, I examine how 
this principle can be adapted to pre-plea discovery. 
III. ADAPTING DUE PROCESS TO PRE-PLEA DISCOVERY 
Part II’s structural critique of the right to information cases is helpful 
in understanding how pre-plea discovery ought to work. Because the 
criminal justice system is based principally upon plea bargaining instead of 
jury trials, the task is to adapt constitutional guarantees to plea bargaining 
procedure.173 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been slow to do this.174 
(Although there is a venerable tradition of scholarly jeremiads calling for its 
abolition,175 there is no reason to think that plea bargaining is going away. 
Thus, it is sensible, if a little disappointing, to consider ways to regulate the 
practice.) Still, there is a good opportunity to do so for pre-plea discovery 
because the Supreme Court’s right to information cases are principally 
grounded in due process. Modern due process jurisprudence has shown 
itself to be flexible enough to meet the demands of a variety of situations. 
Part III(A) discusses the evolution of the test for criminal due process 
from one based on historical practice to one based on a fact-specific 
balancing of interests. Part III(B) shows how the Supreme Court wrongly 
applied the due process balancing test in its most significant case about pre-
plea discovery, United States v. Ruiz. Finally, in Part III(C), I propose my 
own due process balancing test for pre-plea discovery based on Part II’s 
structural critique. 
A. DUE PROCESS EVOLVING 
Although the core purpose of due process has always been to make fair 
and accurate adjudicatory decisions,176 the Supreme Court has used 
different tests over time for determining whether a particular feature of 
criminal procedure comported with due process. An important early case is 
Murray’s Lessee (1855), involving the federal government’s use of a non-
judicial warrant to recover embezzled funds.177 The Supreme Court decided 
 
173 Bibas, supra note 56, at 1138. 
174 The Supreme Court has generally been more willing to apply due process 
protections to trials than to pre-trial procedures. See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, 
Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3–4 (2006). The first major Supreme 
Court case upholding plea bargaining was Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), 
although plea bargaining had already long been in use. FISHER, supra note 8, at 175–80. 
175 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 8, at 1909; Alschuler, supra note 8, at 52. 
176 SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 89, at 88. 
177 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 275 
(1856). 
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what constituted due process in that case by reference to the common law 
and accepted practices at the time of the Fifth Amendment’s passage.178 In 
other words, the Court took history for its guide. 
A later case, Hurtado v. California (1884), took a markedly different 
approach in assessing a state’s procedural innovation.179 The Supreme 
Court held that California had not violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause by allowing prosecutors in felony cases to dispense 
with the grand jury indictment and to proceed instead by way of a judicial 
probable cause determination. The Hurtado Court took a different view of 
the common law than Murray’s Lessee: “[I]t was the characteristic principle 
of the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, 
[and] we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been 
exhausted.”180 Even if California’s procedure did not comport with the 
common law, as long as the procedure was consistent with “fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice,” due process was satisfied.181 The new 
procedure must be non-arbitrary and substantially equivalent to the 
common law procedure in its protections afforded to defendants.182 
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly so held, it appears 
that the due process cases upholding the constitutionality of plea bargaining 
like Bordenkircher v. Hayes183 have implicitly drawn on the reasoning of 
Hurtado. In Hurtado, California replaced the grand jury—a venerable, 
extra-governmental check on prosecutorial power—with a preliminary 
hearing before a judge. The Supreme Court found that hearing to be a 
constitutionally adequate alternative to a grand jury indictment. Likewise, 
even though Bordenkircher also weakens structural protections, giving 
prosecutors too much power at the expense of other criminal justice actors 
by placing enormous pressure on defendants to waive their constitutional 
right to a jury trial, the Court found no due process violation. This holding 
can best be understood as viewing plea bargaining as “a constitutionally 
adequate alternative procedure for the determination of guilt.”184 
Modern due process cases have drawn on either the historical analysis 
of Murray’s Lessee or the more pragmatic approach of Hurtado.185 The 
 
178 Id. at 280; SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 89, at 82–83. 
179 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
180 Id. at 531. 
181 Id. at 535; SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 89, at 84. 
182 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538; SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 89, at 84. 
183 See supra Part II(A). 
184 See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 35 at 915 (assessing plea bargaining practice in 
light of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). 
185 Of course, the difference between the two approaches need not be so stark. See, e.g., 
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landmark test announced in Eldridge expanded the Hurtado approach by 
considering the merits of a particular procedure without reference to 
history.186 There, the Supreme Court considered the process due in a civil 
case and articulated a balancing test187 that was subsequently adapted to 
criminal cases such as Ake.188 
The balancing test first considered “the private interest that will be 
affected by the action of the State.”189 Because defendants have a risk of 
being deprived of life, liberty, or property, they have “an almost uniquely 
compelling” interest in procedures that “diminish the risk of erroneous 
conviction.”190 The second factor is “the governmental interest that will be 
affected if the safeguard is to be provided.”191 The Court made clear that the 
state has an “interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal 
cases”192 and downplayed the costs involved to the state in paying for the 
services of a single medical expert.193 The third factor was “the probable 
value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, 
and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those 
safeguards are not provided.”194 
In Medina v. California, the Supreme Court considered whether a state 
criminal procedural rule violated due process.195 The Court, distinguishing 
Ake,196 held that the Eldridge balancing test was inappropriate for 
evaluating state criminal procedural rules.197 The Court reasoned that the 
 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“‘Due process’ is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law—the least confined to history 
and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society. But neither the 
unfolding content of ‘due process’ nor the particularized safeguards of the Bill of Rights 
disregard procedural ways that reflect a national historic policy.”); Medina v. California, 505 
U.S. 437, 443 (1992). 
186 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976). 
187 Id. at 334–35. 
188 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). For a further discussion on Ake v. Oklahoma, see supra Part 
II(C)(2). The Supreme Court used the same balancing test in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 
622, 631 (2002); see infra Part III(C). 
189 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
190 Id. at 78. 
191 Id. at 77 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
192 Id. at 79. The Mathews test has been criticized for not considering fairness. 
SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 89, at 93. 
193 See Ake, 470 U.S. at 79–80. 
194 Id. at 77 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
195 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992). 
196 Id. at 444–45. The concurrence was not persuaded by the majority’s attempt to 
distinguish Ake. Id. at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring); SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 89, 
at 97–98. 
197 Medina, 505 U.S. at 443. 
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states had substantial expertise, through common law experience, in 
designing criminal procedures, and their considered judgments in that 
regard should not be proscribed by the Due Process Clause unless they 
“offend[ed] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”198 Fundamental 
fairness could be gauged by historical practice.199 Where history was not 
conclusive, the Court would ask simply whether the state rule ran afoul of 
“any recognized principle of ‘fundamental fairness,’”200 defined 
narrowly.201 The Court has never definitively decided whether it will apply 
the deferential Medina test or the Eldridge (Ake) test to criminal due 
process cases.202 
B. THE RIGID DUE PROCESS OF UNITED STATES V. RUIZ 
In Ruiz, Angela Ruiz had been arrested carrying thirty kilograms of 
marijuana in her luggage. The prosecution offered her a reduced sentence in 
exchange for a plea agreement that would have guaranteed discovery of 
“any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the 
defendant” but required Ruiz to waive any right to discovery of witness 
impeachment information.203 Ruiz rejected the plea agreement, pleaded 
guilty, and sought the benefit of the rejected plea agreement at sentencing. 
The Supreme Court held that due process did not require the government to 
turn over impeachment evidence before the guilty plea.204 
The Ruiz Court reasoned that a constitutional guilty plea waiver 
required only a general “awareness of relevant circumstances” and not a 
“complete knowledge” of those circumstances.205 Although the Court 
conceded that well-informed pleas are “wiser,” a plea was “voluntary” if 
made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the general 
consequences of the plea.206 Such awareness need not include the specific 
circumstances of the plea such as the strength of the prosecution’s case or 
 
198 Id. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)). 
199 Id. at 446. 
200 Id. at 448 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)). 
201 Id. at 443 (citing Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165, 170 (1952) (“We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and 
disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.”). 
202 See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1101 (2014) (declining to decide the 
reach of Medina and Mathews). 
203 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002). 
204 Id. at 633. 
205 Id. at 630. 
206 Id. at 629–30; see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969). 
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likelihood of conviction at trial.207 This holding was in line with Supreme 
Court precedent judging waivers as “an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.”208 
In Brady v. United States (not to be confused with Brady v. Maryland), 
the Supreme Court arguably took a slightly broader view of whether a 
waiver was truly knowing and intelligent.209 The Court in Brady v. United 
States held that a guilty plea could still be voluntary even if entered into to 
avoid the death penalty. Although a knowing waiver required only 
“sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences,”210 the Court highlighted the desirability of the defendant, 
with the assistance of counsel, making “an intelligent assessment of the 
relative advantages of pleading guilty”211 and “rationally weigh[ing] the 
advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty.”212 
This implies that defendants without adequate knowledge of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the prosecution’s case might not be “knowingly” 
pleading guilty. Several commentators have argued that a guilty plea is not 
knowing and voluntary if the defendant lacks knowledge of material 
exculpatory evidence.213 The lower courts, both before and after Ruiz, have 
struggled with the issue of whether a generalized pre-plea Brady duty 
exists.214 The First Circuit has held that a prosecutor’s failure to disclose 
evidence could negate the knowingness and voluntariness of a guilty 
 
207 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629–30. 
208 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); see also id. 
209 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
210 Id. at 748. 
211 Id. at 748 n.6. 
212 Id. at 750. 
213 See Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to 
Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 
3612 & n.125 (2013) (citing McMunigal, supra note 35, at 964). Some have gone so far as to 
argue that a waiver of the right to Brady material cannot be knowing and intelligent because 
the information is material to guilt or innocence and the defendant does not know what he 
does not know. See Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty 
Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 581–
84 (1999). 
214 See Douglass, supra note 32, at 440 n.11 (pointing to differing interpretations of 
whether a pre-plea Brady duty exists pre-Ruiz). For cases after Ruiz, compare United States 
v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (refusing to extend Ruiz to Brady), with 
McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787–88 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding it “highly likely” 
that the Supreme Court would, if faced with the issue, extend Ruiz to Brady). For a 
discussion of how Lafler and Frye might shed light on lower courts’ dilemma, see Covey, 
supra note 165, at 600–02. 
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plea.215 
The central problem with Ruiz is that it ignores Brady v. Maryland’s 
fairness rationale: due process is violated where the defense lacks access to 
exculpatory evidence because the resulting trial would be unfair. For 
example, the Ruiz Court concluded that defendants who plead guilty 
voluntarily, even if the government fails to disclose impeachment 
information to them, are in fact guilty.216 The Supreme Court made a 
similar assumption in Brady v. United States and other cases.217 But there is 
a real danger that factually innocent defendants will rationally choose to 
plead guilty based on the perceived strength of the government’s case. One 
antidote is a right, enforceable before the guilty plea, to all material, 
exculpatory evidence. 
Another shortcoming of Ruiz is that it declines to hold that plea 
bargaining implicates not just innocence and guilt, but also sentencing. In 
fact, even though plea bargaining collapses adjudication and sentencing in 
most cases,218 the Supreme Court has never held that defendants have a 
right to understand the sentencing consequences of their pleas.219 Instead, if 
the defendant is factually guilty, then any sentencing consequences of 
which he was not aware at the time of the guilty plea are simply irrelevant 
to the validity of that plea.220 Although there is a range of mutually 
beneficial sentencing outcomes to any guilty plea,221 defendants need 
sufficient information to assess the likely sentencing consequences that they 
face. 
 
215 Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Under limited 
circumstances, however—everything depends on context—the prosecution’s failure to 
disclose evidence may be sufficiently outrageous to constitute the sort of impermissible 
conduct that is needed to ground a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea.”). 
216 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629–30 (2002). 
217 Note, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 1004, 1009 (1986) (“[T]he [Brady] opinion seems to reflect a belief that all guilty 
pleas that meet the voluntary and intelligent standard are honest and truthful confessions and 
are not affected by factors independent of the defendant’s guilt or innocence—in other 
words, that such pleas are accurate.”); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 263–64 
(1973). 
218 Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 150, 171 (2012) (“Charging is now convicting, which is sentencing. Plea 
bargaining itself has undermined these checks and balances, and judges need to use their 
remedial powers to restore some semblance of balance, however imperfect.”); Note, 
Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 287–88 (1972). 
219 See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: 
The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 588 (2014) (“Thus far, the 
Court has not taken an expansive view in defining ‘intelligent.’”). 
220 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629–30. 
221 See Lain, supra note 22, at 25. 
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The Ruiz Court formulated a bright-line rule that would not slow down 
the machinery of plea bargaining. Previously, the Court had held that 
impeachment evidence should be evaluated for materiality just the same as 
any other form of exculpatory evidence.222 This rule required laborious, 
case-by-case consideration, but for good reason: impeachment evidence can 
be the most powerful Brady material of all, as when a police officer’s or a 
confidential informant’s history of dishonesty casts his version of events in 
an entirely different light. But the Court held that impeachment 
information, because it helps defendants in only “random” ways,223 simply 
need not be disclosed—no case-specific materiality analysis was needed. 
The Ruiz Court, drawing on Ake and Eldridge, balanced the following 
considerations: “(1) the nature of the private interest . . . (2) the value of the 
additional safeguard, and (3) the adverse impact of the requirement upon 
the Government’s interests.”224 As for the first factor, the Court decided that 
discovery of impeachment evidence was of only limited use to defendants, 
especially where they were not waiving the right to receive discovery 
showing their factual innocence of the crime.225 As for the second factor, 
the Court concluded with little analysis that the proposed rule would not 
decrease the chance of innocent people pleading guilty.226 The third factor 
prevailed, because the proposed rule could seriously interfere with the 
efficient administration of justice.227 
Ironically, although Ruiz employed a modern due process balancing 
test, the Court did not account for the fact that Brady, if not adapted to plea 
bargaining, is a dead letter for the 97% of federal defendants who plead 
guilty. In other contexts, particularly ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
Court has recognized the new legal landscape and extended trial-based 
rights to plea bargaining.228 Given the kinship between due process and 
separation of powers, I argue that separation of powers principles should 
have informed the application of the balancing test in Ruiz. In the next 
section, I explain how the balancing test should be adapted to pre-plea 
discovery. 
 
222 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); see also Napue v. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (pointing out that witness credibility can determine the outcome of 
trial). 
223 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630. 




228 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
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C. A DUE PROCESS BALANCING TEST ADAPTED TO PRE-PLEA 
DISCOVERY 
This section considers how to determine whether a defendant has 
received due process in pre-plea discovery. The Eldridge /Ake balancing 
test is the best jumping-off point because it provides the most flexibility in 
responding to modern legal problems. In Eldridge, the Supreme Court 
considered what process was due in denying social security benefits. This 
was a modern, administrative law question that was not amenable to 
resolution by historical inquiry.229 Likewise, the problem of pre-plea 
discovery is a modern concern: it did not largely supplant the jury trial 
until, at the latest, the 1920s.230 Like the social security question in 
Eldridge, pre-plea discovery cannot be productively analyzed solely by 
reference to past practices but is instead a modern phenomenon calling for a 
modern test.231 Just as the Eldridge test has yielded meaningful baseline 
rules in the civil context,232 my modified Eldridge test helps establish 
meaningful baseline rule for pre-plea disclosures. 
Of course, as I have already argued, providing due process in plea 
bargaining requires sensitivity to structural considerations of restraining 
executive discretion to put adequate information into the hands of plea 
bargaining defendants, who in large measure convict and sentence 
themselves. Thus, for pre-plea discovery, I would modify the Eldridge/Ake 
test to balance the interests of criminal defendants and society. First, to 
gauge the defendant’s interests, one should ask whether, from a pre-trial 
perspective, the undisclosed material at issue is likely to play a significant 
role in the preparation of the defense for plea bargaining. This includes the 
related aims of accurately sorting the innocent from the guilty (discussed 
below in Part III(C)(1)) and promoting reasonably informed sentencing that 
minimizes unwarranted sentencing disparities (discussed below in Part 
III(C)(2)). A second question that gauges defendants’ interests is structural: 
whether there are clear judicial standards to review the prosecutor’s 
decision not to disclose that can be enforced before the guilty plea 
(discussed below in Part III(C)(3)). Finally, we should ask whether the 
 
229 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453–54 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
230 FISHER, supra note 8, at 1. 
231 For this reason, in District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 
the Supreme Court, which applied the Medina test in considering a modern question—
defendants’ post-conviction rights to access DNA evidence—should have instead used a 
modern due process balancing test. 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009). 
232 Cf. Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1322 (2012) 
(discussing how predecessors to Mathews required notice “at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”). 
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production of pre-plea discovery would impose undue costs on society 
(discussed below in Part III(C)(4)). 
1. Promoting Accuracy in Adjudication 
To apply Brady to pre-plea discovery, I begin with Brady’s materiality 
requirement, which asks how the withheld information might have changed 
the trial or sentencing outcome.233 Because plea bargaining puts the onus of 
adjudication and sentencing on defendants instead of juries and judges, the 
structural critique suggests that we ask how the withheld information might 
have changed the plea agreement. 
First, consider how withheld information might have changed the 
outcome of the proceedings in terms of innocence or guilt. A jury, to 
convict, would see and hear all the witnesses, listen to the entire trial, weigh 
all the evidence and arguments, and ultimately decide whether the 
government had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Because a plea-
bargaining defendant performs this task instead of the jury, the key issue is 
how the withheld information might have affected the defendant’s decision 
to plead guilty. 
The Supreme Court has used similar reasoning to adapt the right to 
effective assistance of counsel, which is a trial-based right, to plea 
bargaining. In Hill v. Lockhart, the High Court held that a defendant who 
had pleaded guilty due to ineffective assistance of counsel could show that 
he had been prejudiced by demonstrating a “reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.”234 Prejudice was to be measured both 
subjectively235 and objectively.236 
Hill’s materiality test, although not explicitly analyzed in terms of 
separation of powers principles and getting sufficient information into the 
hands of the adjudicator, is consistent with this Article’s approach. Just as 
the due process materiality standard looks to how withheld information 
might have affected the jury verdict or sentence, the Sixth Amendment right 
to effective assistance of counsel looks to how information that defense 
counsel incompetently failed to convey to the defendant might have 
affected the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.237 The similarities between 
 
233 See supra Part II(B). 
234 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
235 Id. at 60 (“Petitioner did not allege in his habeas petition that, had counsel correctly 
informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted 
on going to trial.”). 
236 Id. at 59–60 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)). 
237 Petegorsky, supra note 213, at 3636; see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 
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these two standards is no coincidence: the Supreme Court, in formulating 
its Strickland v. Washington materiality standard (later adopted in Hill), 
explicitly drew on Brady’s materiality standard.238 That the materiality tests 
are so similar should come as no surprise, because both of them are 
designed to prevent a breakdown in the adversarial process, which happens 
when the defendant lacks sufficient information.239 And both of these rights 
are too fundamental to be “lost in translation” from our old trial-based 
system to our system of pleas. 
Several circuit courts have formulated materiality rules applying Brady 
to pre-plea discovery. These rules borrow from the same logic of Strickland 
and Hill’s materiality standards that look to how the withheld information 
affected the defendant. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. United 
States asked “whether there is a reasonable probability that but for the 
failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant would have refused to 
plead and would have gone to trial.”240 This is an objective test that focuses 
on “the likely persuasiveness of the withheld information,”241 presumably to 
a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes.242 
The Sanchez test has been criticized for focusing on the defendant’s 
state of mind instead of on whether the undisclosed evidence undermines 
the court’s confidence in whether the defendant who pleads guilty is 
actually guilty.243 To be sure, any materiality test ought to help to sort 
factually innocent from factually guilty defendants. But that argument does 
not address the core structural problem of plea bargaining: defendants who 
plead guilty have to act as their own judge and jury. And the objectivity of 
Sanchez’s materiality test allows courts to consider whether undisclosed 
exculpatory evidence would have caused a reasonable defendant not to 
plead guilty. 
For reasons already explained, my proposed balancing test must be 
conducted from a pre-trial perspective to be useful in evaluating the 
 
(2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
238 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (drawing on Agurs in formulating its materiality 
standard). 
239 Id. at 685–87. 
240 Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Miller v. 
Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1321–22 (2d Cir. 1988); Conte, supra note 13, at 91–92 & n.94. 
241 Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454 (quoting Miller, 848 F.2d at 1322). 
242 The First Circuit has also applied an objective test. Ferrara v. United States, 456 
F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006). 
243 Douglass, supra note 106, at 588–89 (2007) (“The question is not whether defendant 
made an informed choice to plead guilty. The question is whether undisclosed Brady 
evidence undermines our confidence in the adjudication of guilt that is based on that plea.”). 
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sufficiency of pre-plea discovery.244 Thus, instead of using Brady’s post-
trial materiality test, I borrow pre-trial materiality tests from one of the right 
to information cases discussed above in Part II(C). In Trombetta v. 
California, the Court imposed a law enforcement duty to preserve evidence 
that “might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s 
defense.”245 The pre-trial test is necessary to empower judges to check 
prosecutorial discovery discretion before a guilty plea. Finally, evidence 
that prosecutors think is inculpatory might actually be or become mitigating 
or exculpatory with proper defense investigation and preparation. This 
weighs in favor of a broad pre-plea discovery regime. 
2. Informed Sentencing and Unwarranted Disparities 
Next, consider how information withheld by the prosecutor might have 
changed the sentence in a case. The sentencing judge considers everything 
the jury hears at trial, information that was excluded from trial under the 
law of evidence, and a wide variety of other information that comes to light 
during pre-trial proceedings and at sentencing.246 Sentencing judges 
consider not just the offense of conviction but the defendant’s history and 
character, the defendant’s criminal history, and conduct related to the 
offense of conviction. They consider the equities of the case, the purposes 
of punishment, and how similarly situated defendants have been treated.247 
For the defendant to perform adequately as his own judge and jury, he 
needs a similar amount of information about his case. 
The American Bar Association has issued nonbinding guidelines for 
prosecutors consistent with these principles. The guidelines direct 
prosecutors to provide “complete and accurate information” to the 
sentencing judge, including “any information in the prosecutor’s files 
relevant to the sentence.”248 To the extent that the presentence report is 
incomplete, the prosecutor must make appropriate disclosures to the court 
and defense counsel.249 This guideline goes beyond Brady by requiring the 
disclosure of both inculpatory and exculpatory information at sentencing 
and is based on principles of fairness, accuracy, and distributive justice. 
 
244 See supra Part II(B). 
245 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984); see supra Part II(C)(1). 
246 See supra Part I(C)(2). 
247 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-6.1(a) (3d ed. 1993) (“The 
prosecutor . . . should seek to assure that a fair and informed judgment is made on the 
sentence and to avoid unfair sentence disparities.”). 
248 Standard 3-6.2(a). 
249 Id. 
1. MCCONKIE 4/6/2017  7:01 PM 
50 MCCONKIE [Vol. 107 
Courts have been reluctant to formulate post-trial materiality tests 
related to sentencing. For example, the Sanchez test (discussed above at 
Part III(B)(1)) relates only to guilt or innocence. Given society’s strong 
interest in similarly situated defendants receiving similar sentences, a better 
materiality test would also ask whether a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s shoes might have still pleaded guilty on the same terms and 
received the same sentence had he known about the undisclosed 
information.250 
Perhaps one reason that courts have been reluctant to formulate a post-
guilty plea Brady materiality test related to sentencing is the difficulty of 
formulating a remedy. Where a defendant pleads guilty based on 
misinformation, a simple remedy is to allow the defendant to withdraw the 
guilty plea.251 Likewise, where a plea offer lapses or is rejected due to 
counsel’s incompetence, the Supreme Court has held that prejudice can be 
established where the defendant shows “a reasonable probability that the 
end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable by 
reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.”252 The 
remedy in that situation is to force the prosecutor to re-open the former 
offer, and then ask if the defendant would have taken the offer and if the 
court would have approved it.253 
As if that were not hard enough, the harder case is where a lack of 
discovery causes a defendant, who would have certainly pleaded guilty, to 
agree to a heavier sentence than he otherwise would have. Allowing the 
defendant to withdraw his plea might not make him whole because he has 
no constitutional right for the prosecutor to later make a different plea 
offer.254 The best way to make the defendant whole might be to give him 
the deal that he would have agreed to had he known of that undisclosed 
information. Unfortunately, that standard might be unworkable, requiring 
 
250 Where the defendant pleaded guilty without knowledge of inculpatory evidence that 
would increase the sentence, there are at least two instances where prejudice might not 
occur. First, the sentencing court might allow the defendant to withdraw from the plea 
agreement. Second, the sentencing court might decide not to consider the undisclosed 
information at sentencing. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(C) (allowing court to prohibit party 
from using evidence that was not disclosed in violation of Rule 16). 
251 In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Supreme Court refused to find that 
Hill’s counsel had been ineffective because Hill had failed to allege that, but for the 
allegedly ineffective advice, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon a trial. Id. at 
60. However, had the Court upheld the claim, it seems reasonable that the remedy could 
have been allowing Hill to withdraw his guilty plea. 
252 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012). 
253 Id. at 1410–11. 
254 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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intense judicial supervision of plea negotiations that never occurred.255 
Fortunately, one way to sidestep and mitigate such problems is to make 
clear, specific rules mandating broad pre-plea discovery for prosecutors to 
follow and to allow pre-plea litigation of discovery disputes.256 
3. Pre-Trial Judicial Enforcement of Discovery Rules 
The proposed due process balancing test considers whether there are 
clear judicial standards to review the prosecutor’s decision not to disclose 
that can be enforced before the guilty plea. In the absence of these 
standards, the prosecutor’s decision not to disclose is completely 
unchecked. The current federal discovery regime sometimes follows this 
approach. For example, Rule 16 contains a mechanism for pre-trial orders 
enforcing disclosures.257 And even though the Brady rule is typically 
enforced only after trial, prosecutors have made use of the procedure 
outlined in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie to seek the court’s pre-trial concurrence 
of a decision to withhold discovery from the defense.258 
Requiring pre-trial judicial supervision and review of prosecutorial 
discovery decisions answers an important criticism of the Eldridge 
balancing test: that it doesn’t establish a procedural floor for due process.259 
Given the historical and conceptual affinity between due process and 
separation of powers, as well as the problems inherent in consolidating all 
discovery discretion in prosecutors, it makes sense that, for pre-plea 
discovery, judges should have clear discovery rules and standards that they 
can enforce before the guilty plea. 
4. Not Imposing Undue Costs on Society 
Against the interests of the defendant and the public in fair and 
informed adjudication and sentencing, my proposed test balances the 
interests of the public (often through the government) in restricting pre-plea 
discovery. Those interests are the administrative cost of producing evidence 
as well as the potential for harm to the government’s case and witnesses by 
revealing the identities of witnesses.260 Such costs are significant in many 
cases, and any pre-plea discovery regime that ignores them runs the risk of 
grinding the system of pleas down to a halt. 
 
255 It would also contravene Rule 11’s policy prohibiting judicial involvement in plea 
discussions. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(1). 
256 See infra Part IV(A)(2). 
257 FED R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(A); see infra Part IV(A). 
258 See supra Part II(B). 
259 SULLIVAN & MASSALO, supra note 89, at 93–94. 
260 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631–32 (2002). 
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Of course, society’s interests are not mutually exclusive to those of the 
defendant. Society has a strong interest in providing due process to criminal 
defendants. Affording due process to all defendants helps protect the 
innocent, promotes respect for the criminal law, and honors widely shared 
constitutional principles that are fundamental to our democracy. 
5. Whether the Supreme Court Should Adopt This Proposed Test 
Although my proposed test is based on due process and separation of 
powers principles, the Supreme Court could not adopt it without clarifying 
certain tensions in its jurisprudence concerning the information principle. 
For example, although the Court has shown concern for accurately sorting 
the innocent from the guilty, that concern has only manifested itself in 
Brady’s concern for fair trials; the Ruiz Court incorrectly concluded that 
failing to disclose impeachment evidence categorically posed no danger to 
the accuracy of guilty pleas. Still, because Ruiz drew a sharp distinction 
between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence generally, the 
Supreme Court could still find a generalized pre-plea Brady duty that helps 
protect the innocent from pleading guilty.261 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected a general 
right to discovery that would help defendants effectively prepare a defense, 
assess the strength of the government’s case, and understand the likely 
sentencing consequences of a guilty plea versus a jury trial.262 This rejection 
is in tension with several due process and compulsory process cases 
discussed above in Part II that uphold the right of defendants, under certain 
circumstances, to receive information—exculpatory or not—in the 
government’s possession that is material to the preparation of their defense. 
The Court has recently emphasized in Ruiz that the Brady rule is not 
enforceable pre-trial. However, several of the Court’s cases in other 
contexts have asked whether certain material is likely to play a significant 
role in the preparation of the defense.263 Likewise, Rule 16 itself requires 
disclosures of certain materials that are material to the preparation of the 
defense, although the rule puts no time limit on that disclosure 
requirement.264 
The difficulty in formulating constitutional rules relating to pre-plea 
discovery is that the delicate balancing of competing interests does not lend 
itself to simple, black letter rules. The Court’s attempts to formulate 
 
261 Many commentators have advocated for this. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 22, at 5. 
262 See discussion of Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), supra Part II(B). 
263 See supra Part II. 
264 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i), (F)(iii). 
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specific discovery rules that go beyond Brady have not been successful. For 
example, in Jencks v. United States, the Court announced a new rule 
pursuant to its supervisory power: that when a witness testified at trial on 
direct examination, the government had to disclose to the defense any prior 
inconsistent statements.265 Lower courts began to elaborate upon that rule, 
spawning uncertainty and complexity.266 Congress responded with the 
Jencks Act, a similar but more narrow and inflexible rule.267 In 
subsequently upholding the Jencks Act, the High Court recognized that its 
authority to create non-constitutionally-mandated discovery rules existed 
only where Congress had not acted.268 Congress’ general supremacy over 
criminal procedural rulemaking is premised on its superior capacity as a 
democratic branch to make uniform, detailed rules that balance defendants’ 
and society’s interests in criminal discovery. 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s plea bargaining jurisprudence has 
consistently prioritized the public’s interest in maximizing plea bargains 
over the due process interests of the public and defendants.269 Still, the 
Court has recently extended the right to effective assistance of counsel to 
the plea-bargaining stage and conceded that plea bargaining “is the criminal 
justice system.”270 Perhaps future decisions based on that concession will 
cause the pendulum to swing back the other way. 
Even if my proposed test is not adopted by the Supreme Court, it can 
still provide helpful guidance to other rulemaking bodies, like Congress, the 
Department of Justice, and district court judges, in formulating rules of pre-
plea discovery. In Part IV, I also discuss how my structural/due process test 
validates the local rules relating to pre-plea discovery in several district 
courts. 
IV. INNOVATIVE DISTRICT COURT RULES REQUIRING BROAD  
PRE-PLEA DISCOVERY 
My proposed structural/due process balancing test for pre-plea 
discovery gives specific guidance to courts in evaluating whether pre-plea 
discovery regimes comport with due process. My test also explains why the 
local discovery rules in several districts are consistent with the Constitution. 
 
265 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957). 
266 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 346 & n.3 (1959). 
267 Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). 
268 Palermo, 360 U.S. at 353 & n.11. 
269 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631–32 (2002); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750–72 (1970). 
270 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William 
J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
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In this section I highlight several key features of these rules: (1) they have 
broader disclosure standards than Brady or Rule 16 require; (2) they specify 
whole categories of discovery outside of Rule 16 that must be disclosed; (3) 
they require discovery to be provided soon after the arraignment and thus in 
time to influence plea bargaining; (4) they allow prosecutors to seek the 
court’s permission to defer discovery in appropriate cases; (5) they require 
the parties to meet and confer about discovery issues before resorting to 
motions; and (6) they are as self-executing as possible so that the defense 
need not file discovery motions. 
I briefly discuss how, in districts that have not adopted broad pre-plea 
discovery, individual judges can accomplish the same results by issuing 
discovery orders in every case. 
Finally, I mention a few proposals outside of local rulemaking for 
implementing the policies behind my balancing test,271 with the aim of 
promoting uniform and broad pre-plea discovery throughout the federal 
system. 
A. LOCAL RULES 
Many district courts, responding to the need for clarity in regulating 
pre-plea discovery, have implicitly weighed the same concerns that my 
balancing test addresses272 and taken advantage of Rule 57’s broad 
rulemaking authority. 
1. How Criminal Procedural Rules Are Made 
Congress and the courts jointly regulate discovery through a 
rulemaking process established by the Rules Enabling Act.273 A committee 
made up of Supreme Court and federal judges drafts rules; the public has an 
opportunity to comment on the rules; the rules are revised accordingly and 
transmitted to the Supreme Court for approval. The Supreme Court 
transmits the rules to Congress, which must act on the rules within six 
months or they automatically go into effect.274 
To allow fine-tuning of these rules, Congress has granted local 
rulemaking power to the district courts under Rule 57 and 28 U.S.C. 
 
271 See supra Part III(C). 
272 See supra Part III(C). 
273 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
274 See Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1655 (1995) (describing the federal rulemaking process in detail); see also 28 U.S.C. § 
2072(b) (2012) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All 
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have 
taken effect.”). 
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§ 2071. Through these statutes, Congress has re-allocated substantial 
rulemaking authority to the district courts,275 allowing district courts to 
make rules governing the practice in their own districts. 
2. Significant Innovations in Local Rules Related to Pre-Plea Discovery 
A survey of these local rules reveals an overarching theme of 
constraining prosecutorial discretion through district court regulation of 
pre-plea discovery. Because district courts have inherent authority to 
enforce their own local rules, they give the defense an immediate 
enforcement remedy for discovery violations and thus increase the 
likelihood that the defense will have the discovery it needs in time for plea 
bargaining. 
First, many districts have a broader standard of materiality for pre-trial 
discovery than Brady (or even Rule 16)276 requires. For example, the 
District of Vermont requires disclosure of “[a]ll information and material 
known to the government that may be favorable to the defendant on the 
issues of guilt or punishment, as provided by Brady v. Maryland,” within 
fourteen days of arraignment.277 That phrase, “may be favorable,” is a pre-
trial standard much broader than the Bagley materiality standard, which 
requires “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding [as determined post-trial] would 
have been different.”278 Similarly, the District of Massachusetts requires 
broad disclosure of “exculpatory information” within twenty eight days of 
arraignment, although certain categories of exculpatory information need 
 
275 Linda J. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis As A Method for Determining the 
Validity of Federal District Courts’ Exercise of Local Rulemaking Power: Application to 
Local Rules Mandating Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483, 485 (1991). 
Local civil rules have had wide variation. Id.; see also COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: 
LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1989) (reviewing local civil rules and finding wide 
variety). 
276 As a point of comparison, Rule 16 sets forth a broader materiality standard than 
Brady for certain categories of discovery by requiring the prosecution to produce certain 
documents, objects, and reports of examinations and tests if they are “material to preparing 
the defense” or if “the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial.” FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i), (a)(1)(E)(ii), and (F)(iii). Under Rule 16, evidence is “material” if 
“there is a strong indication that it will play an important role in uncovering admissible 
evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or 
rebuttal.” United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
277 D. VT. L. CRIM. R. 16(a)(2). 
278 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
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not be turned over until just before trial.279 “Information” is a broader 
category than admissible evidence, and by definition, it need not be 
“material” under Brady and Bagley, because it must be turned over long 
before trial. From this pre-trial (and typically pre-plea) perspective, 
exculpatory information is information that casts doubt on the government’s 
case, without having to determine how its nondisclosure might affect the 
case’s outcome.280 
Second, many districts have local rules that specify whole categories 
of documents and information to be turned over, regardless of their content. 
These rules increase the flow of information to the defense by forcing 
prosecutors to make disclosures without the need for pre-trial guessing 
about post-trial materiality. The categories of information include: all Rule 
16 discovery,281 search warrant documents,282 electronic surveillance 
materials,283 names and addresses of witnesses,284 impeachment (Giglio) 
information,285 consensual interceptions,286 audio and visual recordings 
related to the charges,287 the identity of unindicted co-conspirators,288 an 
inventory of all items seized by law enforcement,289 and information 
concerning lineups and photo identification procedures, regardless of 
whether the defendant was identified.290 Such information can be 
tremendously helpful in preparing the defense. (As discussed below, to the 
extent that the prosecution can articulate the harm to the government’s case 
 
279 D. MASS. L.R. 116.2(A) (defining “[e]xculpatory information” to include 
information that tends to cast doubt on defendant’s guilt, including impeachment evidence, 
or diminish the degree of the defendant’s culpability); see also D. CONN. L. CRIM. R. 16(a) & 
STANDING ORDER ON DISCOVERY ¶ (A)(11) (requiring disclosure of “All information known 
to the government which may be favorable to the defendant on the issues of guilt or 
punishment within the scope of Brady” within 14 days of arraignment). 
280 D. MASS. L.R. 116.2(a). 
281 See, e.g., D. VT. L. CRIM. R. 16(a)(1); D. MASS. L.R. 116.1(C)(1)(a). 
282 See, e.g., D. VT. L. CRIM. R. 16(a)(4); D. CONN. L. CRIM. R. 16(a) & STANDING 
ORDER ON DISCOVERY ¶ (A)(7); D. MASS. L.R. 116.1(C)(1)(b). 
283 See, e.g., D. VT. L. CRIM. R. 16(a)(5); D. CONN. L. CRIM. R. 16(a) & STANDING 
ORDER ON DISCOVERY ¶ (A)(8); D. MASS. L.R. 116.1(C)(1)(c). 
284 See, e.g., D. VT. L. CRIM. R. 16(a)(3) (“The government may withhold the names 
and/or addresses of those witnesses about whom it has substantial concerns” and must notify 
the defense if it does so); D. CONN. L. CRIM. R. 16(a) & STANDING ORDER ON DISCOVERY ¶ 
(A)(9); N.D. W. VA. L. CRIM. R. 16.07–16.08 (list of witnesses and trial exhibits). 
285 D. CONN. L. CRIM. R. 16(a) & STANDING ORDER ON DISCOVERY ¶ (A)(10). 
286 D. MASS. L.R. 116.1(C)(1)(d). 
287 D. NEV. L. CRIM. R. 16-1(b)(1)(A); D. Vt. Loc. R. 16(a)(4). 
288 D. MASS. L.R. 116.1(C)(1)(e). 
289 N.D. GA. L. CRIM. R. 16.1. 
290 D. MASS. L.R. 116.1(C)(1)(f); see also D. CONN. L. CRIM. R. 16(a) & STANDING 
ORDER ON DISCOVERY ¶ (A)(12); D. MASS. L.R. 116.1(c)(1)(F). 
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or interests that might result from that disclosure, the prosecution must seek 
a protective order.) Rules requiring disclosure of specified categories of 
material spare the defense from the often-insurmountable hurdle of finding 
out whether a piece of discovery exists or proving that it could be helpful to 
the defense.291 
These local discovery rules follow Rule 16’s general approach of 
specifying whole categories of discovery to be turned over before trial. Rule 
16’s categories include the defendant’s statement, documents and objects, 
and reports of scientific examinations and tests and expert witness reports. 
These items must be disclosed without any need for prosecutors to 
determine whether they are inculpatory or exculpatory. Broad discovery of 
pre-defined categories of evidence also assumes that pre-trial disclosures 
help the defense prepare for trial, providing juries and judges with an 
effective adversarial presentation. 
Third, several local rules require disclosure early in the case, which 
would help the defense to prepare for plea bargaining in most federal 
cases.292 Districts with this type of provision most often require discovery to 
be provided within fourteen days of arraignment.293 Some districts require 
discovery to be provided at arraignment.294 Some districts establish a 
separate deadline for the disclosure of certain materials, such as 
impeachment information, that are typically not known to the government 
until just before trial.295 These deadlines pegged to the arraignment stand in 
stark contrast to Rule 16’s silence regarding timing of pre-trial 
disclosures.296 
Fourth, several districts have established presumptively broad 
discovery regimes but allow prosecutors to obtain court orders as needed 
 
291 FED R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes on 1974 amendment. 
292 Federal criminal cases on average take 6.5 months from filing to disposition. MARK 
MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 2009, at 9 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf). Federal 
immigration felonies usually take about four months to resolve, typically by plea deal. See 
MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Immigration 
Offenders in the Federal Justice System, 2010, at 25, 29 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/iofjs10. pdf (revised Oct. 22, 2013). 
293 See, e.g., D. VT. L. CRIM. R. 16(a); E.D. WASH. L. CRIM. R. 16(a); D. MONT. L. CRIM. 
R. 16.1(a); D. NEB. L. CRIM. R. 16.1(a)(3); W.D. TEX. L. CRIM. R. 16(b)(1)(C); M.D. TENN. 
L. CRIM. R. 16.01(a)(2); see also D. HAW. L. CRIM. R. 16.1(a) (within seven days of 
arraignment); D. MASS. L.R. 116.1(C)(1) (28 days). 
294 W.D. PA. L. CRIM. R. 16(B); S.D. ALA. L. CRIM. R. 16.13(b)(1). 
295 See, e.g., D. MASS. L.R. 116.2(B)(2); cf. D. UTAH L. CRIM. R. 16-1(c) (comply with 
Rule 16 14 days before trial). 
296 In fact, such rules may contradict the Jencks Act, too. 
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exempting them from compliance.297 This type of provision seems to 
assume that run-of-the-mill federal cases do not contain any or much 
discovery that cannot reasonably be provided to the defense early in the 
case. 
Fifth, several districts have local rules requiring the prosecution and 
defense to meet and confer about discovery early in the case.298 Some 
districts require the parties to meet and confer before filing a discovery 
motion.299 In Massachusetts, if the prosecution declines to turn over 
particular items of discovery, the prosecution must provide defense counsel 
and the court its reasons. Only then can the defense file a discovery 
motion.300 These rules encourage open dialogue between the parties and 
should help the defense to become aware of potential discovery issues. 
They also may tend to discourage the filing of discovery motions, which 
increase litigation costs and therefore tend to reduce the available benefits 
to both parties from negotiated plea agreements. 
Sixth, these local rules are as self-executing as possible. They may 
require the prosecutor to certify on the record that all discovery required by 
the local rules has been timely provided.301 Similarly, some rules require the 
prosecution to file statements certifying compliance with discovery 
requests.302 They may set a rebuttable presumption that the defense has 
requested discovery,303 instead of requiring the defense to prove under Rule 
 
297 Deal, supra note 76, at 1812 (“[M]y approach identifies the concrete harm that early 
disclosure poses to the adversarial system and asks prosecutors to weigh that harm against 
the costs of keeping favorable evidence from the jury given the particular facts of the case.”). 
One example of this, as the Ruiz Court pointed out, is that turning over witness related 
information can be tailored to the case at hand, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2012) (“[S]uch list 
of the veniremen and witnesses need not be furnished if the court finds by a preponderance 
of the evidence that providing the list may jeopardize the life or safety of any person.”). 536 
U.S. 622, 632 (2002). Rule 16 contains a provision allowing prosecutors to seek such orders. 
FED R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1). 
298 See, e.g., D. ALASKA L. CRIM. R. 16.1(a); D.D.C. L. CRIM. R. 16.1. 
299 See, e.g., D. MINN. L. CRIM. R. 12.1(b); D. UTAH L. CRIM. R. 16-1(a). 
300 See, e.g., D. MASS. L.R. 116.3(F). 
301 See D. UTAH L. CRIM. R. 16-1(f) and (h) (party from whom discovery is requested 
must file a notification of compliance); D. NEB. L. CRIM. R. 16.1(a)(4) (“Upon providing the 
required discovery, the government must file and serve a notice of compliance.”); E.D. 
OKLA. L. CRIM. R. 16.1(A)(1) (requiring prosecutor to put the status of discovery on the 
record at arraignment with specificity); see also Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 47 (2014) (proposing that judges question prosecutors on the record 
regarding their compliance with Brady obligations). 
302 See, e.g., D. NEB. L.R. 16.1(A)(4) (“Upon providing the required discovery, the 
government must file and serve a notice of compliance.”). 
303 E.g., D. MASS. L.R. 116.1(b) (“A defendant shall be deemed to have requested all the 
discovery authorized by Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(D) unless that defendant files a 
1. MCCONKIE 4/6/2017  7:01 PM 
2017] STRUCTURING PRE-PLEA DISCOVERY 59 
16 that it has requested the appropriate discovery.304 Other districts, notably 
Nevada, require the parties to agree on their own discovery schedule, 
enforceable by the court.305 This reduces the need for defense motions and 
simply creates an expectation, enforceable by the court, that discovery will 
be provided.306 
These provisions make a record of the defense’s reliance on the 
prosecutor’s representation that required discovery has been provided or 
does not exist. That reliance has important legal consequences. First, a plea 
was involuntary unless “entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him 
by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.”307 A plea induced by 
misrepresentation may also be rendered involuntary. Thus, the plea may be 
rendered involuntary where the prosecutor inaccurately represents the state 
of discovery preceding a guilty plea. 
The second legal consequence is that defense reliance on the 
prosecutor’s representation broadens Brady’s materiality standard. Under 
the reasoning of Bagley, if the defendant makes a specific request for Brady 
material and does not receive it, the Court is more likely to find that defense 
counsel detrimentally relied on the prosecution’s explicit or implicit 
representation that the requested discovery did not exist.308 Thus, when the 
defense requests a certain class of material, or the local rules require its 
automatic production, the prosecution has less room to err in determining 
whether the information is “material” for Brady purposes.309 Because 
prosecutors have a hard time making this determination anyway,310 rules 
 
Waiver of Request for Disclosure[.]”); E.D. WASH. L. CRIM. R. 16(a); see also D. HAW. L. 
CRIM. R. 16.1(7) (“[I]t shall be presumed that defendant has made a general [Brady] 
request.”); D. KAN. GENERAL ORDER OF SCHEDULING AND DISCOVERY (“In general, the court 
will order the parties to comply with Rules 12, 12.1, 12.2, 16 and 26.2 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, with [Brady and its progeny], and with Title 18, U.S.C. § 3500, as 
well as Rule 404(b), Federal Rules of Evidence. A request is not necessary to trigger the 
operation of the Rules and the absence of a request may not be asserted as a reason for 
noncompliance.”). 
304 FED R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1) and (c)(2). 
305 D. NEV. L. CRIM. R. 16-1. 
306 See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxxiv 
(2015) (proposing that local rules require discovery without the need for defense motions). 
307 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (citation omitted). 
308 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1985). 
309 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, at § 24.3(b) (discussing “Specific Request 
Element”); Deal, supra note 76, at 1792 (discussing Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bagley 
justifying less stringent materiality standard where the defense has actually requested the 
information). 
310 See supra Part I(C)(2). 
1. MCCONKIE 4/6/2017  7:01 PM 
60 MCCONKIE [Vol. 107 
mandating broad disclosure allow prosecutors to avoid prophesying about 
post-trial materiality. 
An important question about these local rules is what effect they are 
actually having on the criminal justice system in their respective districts. 
The fact that such rules have been adopted in dozens of districts throughout 
the country since the 1990s311 is a strong indication that the sky has not 
fallen. But hard empirical data about the effects of these local rules is not 
yet available.312 
In summary, these innovative local rules are designed to put adequate 
information in the hands of the defense in time for plea negotiations, and 
judges can enforce these rules before the guilty plea with minimal litigation. 
These rules are consistent with my due process test for pre-plea discovery, 
and they do not appear to exert a significant drag on the system’s ability to 
process virtually all its cases through guilty pleas, although more research 
needs to be done. 
B. STANDING ORDERS AND CASE-SPECIFIC DISCOVERY ORDERS 
Even in districts that have not promulgated good local discovery rules, 
a judge may regulate her judicial practice “in any manner consistent with 
federal law, these rules, and the local rules of the district.”313 Thus, on a 
case-by-case basis or through the use of standing orders, judges can regulate 
pre-plea discovery. 
Although a full discussion of the district courts’ inherent authority to 
regulate discovery is beyond the scope of this paper, federal courts retain 
“strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers Congress 
expressly conferred in the Rules.”314 The Supreme Court has stated, in 
formulating its own discovery rule through common law methods, that it 
has “power, in the absence of statutory provision, to prescribe procedures 
for the administration of justice in the federal courts.”315 Lower courts have 
likewise recognized this authority.316 In fact, the Advisory Committee stated 
 
311 See, e.g., S.D. FLA. L.R. 88.10 (effective Dec. 1, 1994); D. MASS. L.R. 116.1 
(adopted Sept. 1, 1990); E.D. PA. L. CRIM. R. 16.1 (effective Jan. 1, 1998). 
312 In a future paper, I intend to study this issue by interviewing criminal practitioners in 
several districts that have adopted strong pre-plea discovery regimes. 
313 FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b). 
314 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (citation omitted). 
315 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345 (1959). 
316 United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 54 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing court’s 
inherent authority to order pre-trial disclosure of list of government witnesses); United States 
v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1515 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); United State v. Stubblefield, 325 F. 
Supp. 485, 486 (E.D. Tenn. 1971). 
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that Rule 16 was “not intended to limit the judge’s discretion to order 
broader discovery in appropriate cases.”317 
Some judges have issued blanket, standing discovery orders in all their 
criminal cases. For example, one California judge, in a district that already 
has a local rule requiring discovery to be provided within fourteen days of 
arraignment,318 has routinely required the parties to provide all requested 
discovery “without unreasonable delay.”319 His order carries express 
warnings of penalties for failure to comply, including exclusion of 
evidence.320 
A similar example can be found in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia. It was in that district that the Department of Justice conducted a 
high-profile corruption investigation of Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, and 
the case ultimately had to be dismissed because of Brady violations. Judge 
Emmett G. Sullivan, who presided over the case, issues a Brady compliance 
order in each case requiring the “timely” production of all Brady 
material.321 In contrast, other district courts have refused to issue Brady 
orders on the grounds that Brady is a “self-executing responsibility.”322 
An advantage to these orders is that they are well-suited to the 
exigencies of plea bargaining. By clarifying the parties’ discovery 
obligations, they theoretically reduce litigation. Although it is not clear 
whether these Brady orders result in more discovery being turned over to 
the defense, prosecutors are not likely to resist them (except in cases where 
early compliance would prejudice the government’s interests), either 
because those prosecutors plan on providing the discovery anyway, or they 
do not want to be seen as unjustly withholding discovery. 
In addition to or instead of standing orders, district judges can issue 
case-specific pre-trial orders regulating discovery. These orders usually 
 
317 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes. 
318 E.D. CAL. L.R. 440(a). 
319 Senior District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton used this same standing order for years, 
the violation of which “may result in the imposition of sanctions including, but not limited 
to, monetary sanctions, the exclusion of evidence, or the striking of testimony or 
documents.” United States v. Valencia-Mendoza et al., No. 09-cr-408 LKK (E.D. Cal. Sept. 
24, 2009). 
320 Id. 
321 Standing Brady Order, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/sites/dcd/files/StandingBradyOrder.pdf, accessed on 
October 2, 2014. 
322 United States v. Flores, No. CR 08–0730 WHA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011); see also 
United States v. Avellino, 129 F. Supp. 2d 214, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Absent some type of 
indication, however, that the government is not discharging its Brady obligations, there is no 
need for the Court to undertake the requested in camera review and, for that reason, the 
Court declines to do so.”). 
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issue in response to defense motions. Such motions are relatively rare, for 
several reasons. First, the defense may not be aware of even the general 
nature of the discovery that has been withheld. Second, where the 
defendant’s goal is a plea agreement, filing a motion risks prolonging the 
litigation and incentivizing prosecutors to make less generous plea offers to 
defendants who file discovery motions. 
A practical problem with standing discovery orders, Brady compliance 
orders, and case-specific orders is that meaningful appellate review of such 
orders can be difficult. Direct appeal of pre-trial discovery orders may not 
be available, although the prosecution might seek a writ of mandamus.323 
District courts do not have consistent standards for their application of 
inherent powers. The fact-intensive nature of these situations implies that 
appellate review will be deferential, as for abuse of discretion, but the 
contours of such discretion are still undefined.324 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our federal pre-plea discovery regime does not provide sufficient 
structural protections to defendants. The system must be rebalanced; judges 
need a greater role in enforcing due process-based rights to pre-plea 
discovery.325 For reasons stated above in Part III(C)(5), the Supreme Court 
is not likely to constitutionalize comprehensive pre-plea discovery. The 
Supreme Court could, however, act in its rulemaking capacity to transmit 
amendments to Rule 16 to Congress in line with the innovative local 
discovery rules discussed above in Part IV(A). 
That failing, district courts can continue to promulgate their own local 
discovery rules. Such rules have a decades-long track record in districts 
throughout the country. The District of Massachusetts has one of the best 
and most comprehensive local discovery rules regimes in the country.326 
In the meantime, judges in districts without such rules can enter sua 
sponte Brady compliance orders and discovery orders in every criminal 
case.327 
 
323 United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2001). 
324 See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 763 
(1982). 
325 I and other scholars have proposed other procedures that would facilitate this. 
McConkie, supra note 45; see also, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 
DUQ. L. REV. 559 (2013). 
326 For a discussion of several Massachusetts provisions, see supra Part IV(A)(2). 
327 SIDNEY POWELL, LICENSED TO LIE: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE 213 (2014); see also Kozinski, supra note 306, at xxxiii (recommending that judges 
enter Brady compliance orders in every criminal case). 
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Congress could also pass reform legislation outside of the Rules 
Enabling Act. For example, one recent bill, the Fairness in Disclosure of 
Evidence Act of 2012,328 would have required the prosecution to 
immediately disclose material that reasonably appeared to be favorable to 
the defendant as to guilt or innocence, sentencing, or any preliminary 
matter. The immediacy requirement would create an enforceable pre-plea 
discovery obligation. The government could seek a protective order to defer 
discovery in appropriate cases.329 Unfortunately, this bill died in 
Committee. 
Finally, the Department of Justice has a role to play here as well. It can 
give its line prosecutors stronger and more detailed directives regarding pre-
plea discovery, and it can ensure prosecutors follow these directives by 
providing sufficient training and administering internal discipline where 
necessary to those who do not. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s structural framework for assessing pre-plea discovery 
provides a novel way of appraising our plea-bargaining procedure. Plea 
bargaining generally, and the current pre-plea discovery regime specifically, 
weakens the structural protections that criminal defendants and the public 
should enjoy. Most people would agree that all government actors should 
be “checked” in some way; that the concentration of too much power in the 
hands of prosecutors—the vast majority of whom are well-meaning—is 
dangerous. My structural critique and its associated due process balancing 
test explain why judges and legislatures should have a greater role in 
checking prosecutors. Putting more discovery into the hands of the defense 
is an important check on prosecutorial power because it allows defendants 
to prepare a defense and to plea bargain with a better understanding of their 
likely sentencing exposure. 
Of course, such changes do not actually restore structural protections; 
they merely attempt to approximate what has been lost. Without a jury trial, 
the criminal justice system will never work as originally intended. Many 
scholars have argued that the trial penalty, which incentivizes defendants to 
waive their separation of powers protections like the jury trial, is 
 
328 S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2012), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2197/text. 
329 See A Call for Congress to Reform Federal Criminal Discovery, THE CONSTITUTION 
PROJECT (2012), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/CallforCriminalDiscoveryReform.
pdf; Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 
MERCER L. REV. 639 (2013) (detailed policy analysis of Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence 
Act of 2012). 
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unconstitutional.330 The Supreme Court has not agreed.331 It must certainly 
be the case that plea bargaining is unconstitutional at least in the sense that 
our modern system of pleas bears little resemblance to the Constitution’s 
design and the common-law tradition from which it came. But due process 
needs to look forward, not backwards. As Justice Matthews stated in 
Hurtado: 
[i]t is more consonant to the true philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say 
that the spirit of personal liberty and individual right . . . was preserved and developed 
by a progressive growth and wise adaption to new circumstances.332 
A due process jurisprudence that is sensitive to structural protections can 
balance the interests of defendants and society at large. 
Even if the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence does not catch 
up with the realities of plea bargaining, other branches of government can 
act. Federal prosecutors should provide broad pre-plea discovery as a matter 
of Department-wide policy, not the discretion of individual prosecutors. 
Congress should amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure along the 
lines of my proposed due process balancing test to provide for broad pre-
plea discovery. But many federal district courts are not waiting on 
Congress, the Supreme Court, or the Department of Justice—they have 
promulgated helpful local rules that have inspired this Article’s analysis. 
Hopefully, this structural conception of due process can make plea 




330 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 8. 
331 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–4 (1978). 
332 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884); see also SULLIVAN & MASSARO, 
supra note 89, at 85. 
